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THE NEW LEGAL TRANSNATIONALISM, THE 
GLOBALIZED JUDICIARY, AND THE RULE OF 
LAW 
KEN I. KERSCH∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years in the United States, constitutional reasoning and 
practice has been going global. For many, this trend became apparent for 
the first time when, in the course of its analysis in the recent affirmative 
action and gay rights cases, the U.S. Supreme Court made frank references 
to foreign practices, public opinion, and court decisions, as well as 
international agreements—those ratified by the United States and those 
not.1 While, strictly speaking, not unprecedented, the Court’s transnational 
references in these cases were notable for a number of reasons. First, 
because they took place in decisions not involving international affairs, as 
traditionally defined, but rather in cases involving domestic policy issues 
that are at the heart of partisan political contention, they were unusually 
prominent. Second, rather than amounting to casual allusions, they 
represent a calculated step by key justices on the Court—led by Justice 
Breyer, but also joined by Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy, and O’Connor—to 
bring the Court’s approach toward constitutional interpretation into line 
with new approaches being taken by justices in the courts of other 
 ∗ Assistant Professor of Politics, Princeton University. B.A., Williams; J.D., Northwestern; 
M.A., Ph.D., Cornell. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Workshop on Democracy 
and the Rule of Law at the University of Maryland, co-sponsored by the Democracy Collaborative at 
the University of Maryland and the Key Centre for Ethics, Law, Justice, and Governance of Griffith 
University (Australia), and at the Conference on Global Constitutionalism at the University of 
Toronto, co-sponsored by Toronto’s Department of Political Science, Center of the Study of the 
United States, and the Faculty of Law, and Princeton University’s Program in Law and Public Affairs. 
An earlier and significantly abridged version of this article was published in The Good Society (Fall 
2004). I am particularly indebted to Martin Flaherty, Mark Graber, Noga Morag-Levine, Jeremy 
Rabkin, Charles Sampford, and Karol Soltan for their extensive critiques and suggestions. Creighton 
Page, Princeton ’05, provided research assistance. I would also like to thank Sujit Chaudhry, Chris 
Eisgruber, Stephen Elkin, John Finn, James Fleming, Howard Gillman, Leslie Goldstein, Doug Grob, 
Ran Hirschl, Vicki Jackson, Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, Ronald Kahn, Andrew Moravcsik, Lawrence 
Mead, Adam Naiman, Tom Round, Kim Scheppele, Rogers M. Smith, George Thomas, Mark Tushnet, 
Robin West, and Keith Whittington, for helpful comments and criticisms. 
 1. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 344 
(2003). See also Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). See Ken I. Kersch, Multilateralism Comes 
to the Courts, 154 PUB. INT. 3 (2004) (discussing the use of foreign practices as a yardstick for 
American decisions). 
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countries.2 And third, these efforts in the American judiciary are taking 
place in a distinctive reformist intellectual context in which many scholars 
and activists, both in the United States and around the world, are coming 
to understand legal transnationalism as an imperative.3 As is evident from 
even the most casual perusal of the increasingly high profile journals of 
international law, scholars are now hard at work trying out alternative 
doctrines, seeking those that will be least politically vulnerable. Debates 
involving the applicability of the law of nations, customary international 
law, treaties, international agreements and pronouncements, and foreign 
practices, precedents, judicial reasoning (under the guise of “constitutional 
borrowing”), and public opinion to the decisionmaking processes of 
American judges deciding domestic constitutional cases, more and more 
are filling pages of these law journals. These calculated efforts to 
transform the way in which the Court considers domestic constitutional 
issues may very well mark the beginning of a major departure in the 
direction of American constitutional law. 
This essay argues that the current transnational trend amongst judges 
and scholars is not, as some have argued, business as usual in the 
American courts. It contends that this transnational turn is notably 
distinctive in its historical and political origins and goals. Moreover, while 
the new legal transnationalism evinces a concern for the claims of 
democracy and the rule of law, as applied within advanced industrial 
democratic states like the United States, at least as it is directed toward 
domestic political and constitutional questions, it is part of an elite-driven, 
politically-motivated worldwide trend toward judicial governance, which 
is antithetical to democratic self-rule, if not to the rule of law itself.4 More 
 2. See, e.g., Stephen G. Breyer, The Supreme Court and the New International Law, Speech to 
the American Society of International Law (Apr. 4, 2003), at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/ 
publicinfo/speeches/sp_04-04-03.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2005); SANDRA DAY O’CONNOR, THE 
MAJESTY OF THE LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 231–35 (2003); Sandra Day 
O’Connor, Keynote Address Before the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Society for 
International Law, 96 AM. SOC. INT. L. PROCEEDINGS 348 (2002), available at 
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/inthecourts/HSIL_Keynote_Add_2002_Just_O’Connor.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 6, 2005); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Affirmative Action as an International Human Rights 
Dialogue, 18 BROOKINGS REV. 1, 3 (Winter 2000); KEN I. KERSCH, CONSTRUCTING CIVIL LIBERTIES: 
DISCONTINUITIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 341–58 n.39 (2004). 
 3. KERSCH, supra note 2, at 341–58. 
 4. See generally RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES 
OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004) (describing the worthwhile trend toward judicial 
empowerment); ROBERT H. BORK, COERCING VIRTUE: THE WORLDWIDE RULE OF JUDGES (2003); 
THE GLOBAL EXPANSION OF JUDICIAL POWER (C. Neal Tate & Torbjorn Vallinder eds., 1995). See 
also JEREMY A. RABKIN, THE CASE FOR SOVEREIGNTY: WHY THE WORLD SHOULD WELCOME 
AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (2004) (arguing for greater national independence from world bodies and 
trends); JEREMY A. RABKIN, LAW WITHOUT NATIONS? WHY CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss2/6
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specifically, this movement ties a highly ideological vision of an emerging 
global polity to jointly moralized and administrative visions of judicial 
power, in the service of global judicial empowerment aimed at readily 
identifiable reformist political goals. Political activists within the United 
States, who have failed to achieve these goals through political campaigns 
at home, have turned their hopes to a newly autonomous globalized 
judiciary, through which they hope to secure their goals by alternative 
means.5  
SOME HISTORICAL CONTEXT: WHY NOW? 
In the last few years, legal scholarship has swelled with discussions 
concerning the relationship between domestic legal decisions, foreign 
practices, and international law. Spirited debates about the applicability of 
treaties, international agreements, and the law of nations to domestic legal 
disputes have attracted the attention of law reviews. Discussions of the 
significance of foreign public opinion, foreign rulings, and international 
court decisions for constitutional decisionmaking, including the propriety 
of “constitutional borrowing,” have triggered wide-ranging interest.6 
Denunciations of the “provincialism” and “legal xenophobia” of the 
American judiciary have become commonplace.7 In related initiatives, 
foundations and political activists have sponsored an increasing number of 
workshops and seminars aimed at persuading lawyers and judges to adopt 
a global sensibility in arguing and deciding domestic constitutional cases.8 
As recently as a decade ago, these were relatively arcane topics, and the 
ostensible “problems” they are aimed at addressing, for all intents and 
purposes, did not exist. Why this intense and sudden interest in these 
matters? And why now? 
Certainly, the subject of comparative constitutionalism is not new. In 
its broadest sense, the modern interest in deepening our comparative 
understanding of constitutions began after the Second World War, when, 
REQUIRES SOVEREIGN STATES (2005). 
 5. See JEREMY RABKIN, WHY SOVEREIGNTY MATTERS (1998). 
 6. See Gary Jeffrey Jacobsohn, The Permeability of Constitutional Borders, 82 TEX. L. REV. 
1763 (2004) (discussing transnational jurisprudence and the challenge to comparative constitutional 
theory); Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative 
Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819 (1999) (discussing the globalization of the practice of 
modern constitutionalism). 
 7. See Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 771 (1997) 
(discussing the emergence of constitutionalism globally); Jack Balkin, Legal Xenophobia, July 7, 
2003, at http://balkin.blogspot.com/2003_07_06_balkin-archive.html (last visited Nov. 13, 2004). 
 8. KERSCH, supra note 2, at 357–58. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p345 Kersch book pages.doc4/26/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
348 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 4:345 
 
 
 
 
 
 
following dark days, the free world’s sovereign nations (including, in time, 
the newly de-colonized nations) manifested a commitment to 
constitutional self-government. Sovereignty—understood then as a pre-
condition of constitutional democracy—was, in this post-war context, 
highly valued. So long as free nations were committed to the rule of law 
and a few bedrock democratic principles (set out in hortatory fashion in 
the U.N. Charter and a series of prominent international declarations), the 
choice of institutions was considered the province of sovereign, self-
governing states. What was important was that nations had constitutions. 
A comparative perspective was judged useful because the best choices 
concerning institutional design were made in light of learned 
understandings of the institutions and experiences of others.  
At the same time, certain aspects of the post-war order cut against this 
renewed commitment to sovereignty and the claims that a constitutional 
charter was sufficient. The human rights aspirations in the U.N. Charter 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, although first articulated 
in a form that was respectful of national sovereignty, were framed in 
reaction to the legal positivism used to justify the Nazi genocide.9 For a 
significant number of post-war scholars, intellectuals, and politicians, this 
post-sovereign, post-positivist thrust was the era’s most significant, and 
potentially transformative, development. While some defended the future 
of sovereign, self-governing nation states, these figures proposed a 
cascade of visionary schemes for the establishment of “cosmopolis,” or a 
“world government.” Such calls, the leading historian of this now largely-
forgotten intellectual movement observed, reached a fever pitch in “the 
five plastic years between Hiroshima and Korea,” and became “a major 
national pastime of especially the English-speaking intelligentsia.”10 “The 
chorus grew until it seemed for a brief, deceptive moment, irresistible.”11 
Far from celebrating the United Nations as a coming together of 
independent, self-governing states, the scholars and intellectuals who 
comprised this movement (who in the 1940s were dubbed “one worlders”) 
lambasted the United Nations as an opportunity tragically missed to 
abolish sovereignty and institute a world state.12 Others of a more 
 9. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM 
AND THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 117–78 (1973). See also MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: 
ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001). 
 10. W. WARREN WAGAR, THE CITY OF MAN: PROPHECIES OF WORLD CIVILIZATION IN 
TWENTIETH CENTURY THOUGHT 65 (1967).  
 11. Id. at 221. 
 12. See, e.g., JOHN EHRMAN, THE RISE OF NEOCONSERVATIVISM: INTELLECTUALS AND 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS 1945–1994, 5–9 (1995) (discussing the difficulties of “one worlders” in the post 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss2/6
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managerial or technocratic caste, who saw themselves as less utopian and 
more grounded, spoke not of “cosmopolis” or “world government,” but 
rather—in precisely the same nomenclature currently in circulation—of a 
“new world order,” and a “world constitution,” which, while recognizing 
national sovereignty, nonetheless worked to displace its authority 
gradually in a proliferating array of policy areas.13  
One of the reasons this high-profile movement is now largely forgotten 
is that the grandest hopes of its most visionary members were soon dashed 
by world events. As a practical matter, the Cold War, while not killing the 
belief that there were global human rights standards, proved rocky soil for 
any conviction that those standards could blossom into morally-rooted, 
universal “laws” enforceable by a world government worldwide. When the 
Cold War ended in 1989, however, the entire gamut of the transcendent 
visions of the 1940s—from renewed calls for a world government to a 
“new world order”—miraculously blossomed once again. As nations 
moved out of the ruling orbits of a bipolar world, the conditions mitigating 
against notions of a genuinely enforceable universal law on which all 
reasonable and fair people could agree seemed suddenly to have 
disappeared. In a significant advance from 1945, the concept of 
sovereignty seemed to these thinkers to have been devalued by the 
successes of the European Union and by the maturation of the once-
anathematized United Nations as a bureaucratic entity and a presence with 
“unique legitimacy” on the world stage. A series of institutions of 
multinational ordering—The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Bretton 
Woods, the International Monetary Fund, and the GATT, later the World 
Trade Organization—had apparently proved effective in ordering the free 
world. 
In the midst of this revival, September 11 struck. Transfixed by an 
ideological vision, large swaths of the intelligentsia were infuriated less by 
the attacks themselves than by the U.S. response to them. They 
experienced the latter as a threat to the imminent realization of the dream 
of “global governance” and a “world constitution,” the last best hope for 
bringing perpetual peace and global justice to the world. 
World War II period). 
 13. Id. at 65, 221; See generally FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN, THE COMMONWEALTH OF MAN: AN 
INQUIRY INTO POWER POLITICS AND WORLD GOVERNMENT (1952); E.B. WHITE, THE WILD FLAG: 
EDITORIALS FROM THE NEW YORKER ON FEDERAL WORLD GOVERNMENT AND OTHER MATTERS 
(1946). But see REINHOLD NIEBUHR, THE CHILDREN OF LIGHT AND THE CHILDREN OF DARKNESS: A 
VINDICATION OF DEMOCRACY AND A CRITIQUE OF ITS TRADITIONAL DEFENSE (1944) (discussing the 
importance of democracy in checking the power of rulers); see also EHRMAN, supra note 12, at 5–9. 
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Much discussion concerning the transnational turn in the law focuses 
on distinct arguments concerning the propriety of a single jurisprudential 
path involving, for example, the treaty power, customary international law, 
or constitutional borrowing. It is important, however, to understand the 
arguments as a collection, and in context. Contemporary interest in them 
as a whole is the result of complicated and deeply-rooted historical trends. 
TOWARD A JUDICIALIZED “WORLD COMMUNITY” 
The contemporary globalist revival is distinct from its 1940s 
predecessor in one crucial respect: it post-dates the consolidation of what 
many have come to call “judicial supremacy” in the United States.14 This 
notion, which holds that judges are (absent the adoption of a constitutional 
amendment) the supreme and final arbiters of constitutional meaning, was 
forged in the mid-twentieth century as part of the struggle for civil rights.15 
Contemporary regard for the U.S. Supreme Court as the ultimate hope for 
constitutional justice was heavily shaped by the Court’s landmark rulings 
in a series of school segregation cases, culminating in Brown v. Board of 
Education (1954).16 Intervening in the standoff at Little Rock’s Central 
High several years later, the Court declared itself the supreme and final 
arbiter of constitutional meaning.17 
These events had a profound impact on the moral and constitutional 
authority of assertions of Court power, in both popular consciousness and 
in law.18 In their aftermath, the Court launched its “rights revolution,” in 
which, in the name of constitutional and moral progress, it took up an 
aggressively reformist project of enormous constitutional and political 
significance in a wide variety of areas.19 
 14. See Keith E. Whittington, To Support this Constitution: Judicial Supremacy in the Twentieth 
Century, in MARBURY V. MADISON: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 101 (Mark A. Graber & 
Michael Perhac eds., 2002) (discussing the rise of judicial supremacy); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE 
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004) (discussing the 
role of a constitution in a republican government). 
 15. Whittington, supra note 14, at 102. 
 16. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 17. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). See Keith E. Whittington, The Court as Final Arbiter of 
the Constitution: Cooper v. Aaron, in CREATING CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE: CLASHES OVER POWER 
AND LIBERTY IN THE SUPREME COURT 9 (Gregg Ivers & Kevin McGuire eds., 2004) (analyzing the 
Court’s assertion as ultimate authority); KRAMER, supra note 14, at 221; NEAL DEVINS & LOUIS 
FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 9–28 (2004) (discussing judicial supremacy as orthodoxy). 
 18. The most significant visual representation of the twentieth century constitutionalism, Norman 
Rockwell’s painting of a small, dignified black girl in a white dress being led to school by four federal 
marshals, as they are pelted by tomatoes, stems from these events. Norman Rockwell, The Problem We 
All Live With, LOOK MAG. (1964). 
 19. See generally LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000) 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss2/6
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The court-led rights revolution in the United States was closely 
followed abroad and proved highly influential around the world, inspiring 
many countries to accept the radical empowerment of their judiciaries at 
the expense of democratically-elected legislatures. Brown, the 
proliferation of litigation advocacy groups it inspired, and the rise of the 
public law litigation movement, reversed the traditional progressive 
suspicion of judges as the (anti-democratic) handmaidens of economic 
elites, and helped create the modern identification of judicial power with 
progress, civil liberties, and civil rights.20 The rise of Kantian legal theory 
in the American legal academy in the 1970s—a development aimed at 
providing a coherent theoretical grounding for (and defense of) Warren 
Court (1953–1969) activism—promulgated a picture of the judge 
(famously dubbed “Hercules”) as the heroic tribune of universal morality. 
These influential initiatives within the legal academy reinforced the moral 
authority and, hence, the political power of the judge, and inflated his 
governing pretensions worldwide.21 
After 1989, foreign judges, for various reasons, found the highly 
judicialized American style of politics increasingly attractive. The 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) noted that the U.S. Supreme Court had 
helped to nationalize American politics by gradually negotiating away key 
aspects of the sovereignty of the American states.22 Nations newly 
emerging from dictatorships and countries paralyzed by legislative and 
executive sclerosis knew that the Warren Court had broken the Southern 
stranglehold on Congress in the name of unimpeachable national goals. 
(discussing the direction of the Court from 1953 to 1968); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT 
AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE; RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975) (discussing black America’s 
struggle for equality under the law). It is just recently that scholars have begun to question the 
legitimacy, propriety, and usefulness of a constitutionalism premised on aggressive judicial leadership 
and supremacy. See, e.g., GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN THE SUPREME COURT 
BRING ABOUT SIGNIFICANT SOCIAL CHANGE (analyzing the extent to which the Court can help 
produce liberal change); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 
(1999); Kramer, supra note 14. 
 20. See generally CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND 
SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998); DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 17, at 12; 
Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1975–1976). 
On the earlier progressive suspicion of judicial power, see WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY: 
POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890–1937 (1994). 
 21. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); RONALD DWORKIN, 
A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985). See also THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT 
IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 48–54 (2004) (discussing the Court’s 
modern activism). 
 22. See Anne-Marie Slaughter & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of 
Legal Integration, 47 INT. ORG. 41 (1993) (discussing the legal integration of Europe); Martin 
Shapiro, The European Court of Justice, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY 
(Peter H. Russell & David M. O’Brien eds., 2001). 
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Cognizant of this American success story, these countries turned 
optimistically to courts to break their own policy deadlocks and advance 
the causes of civil liberties and human rights.23 
Unlike their American counterparts, however, these judges were not 
able to defend their assertiveness by appealing to a centuries-old tradition 
that anchored judicial review in constitutional popular sovereignty. 
Instead—and crucially—they anchored their claims to political power in 
their participation, as fellow professionals, in a global project involving 
the identification and protection of human rights, the stewardship of the 
“new” international law, and the technical improvement of the quality of 
constitutional reasoning in general through transnational professional 
consultation. For judges in nations that, not so long ago, were living in 
isolation and tyranny, drawing a demonstrable connection to a worldwide 
project involving a movement toward “global governance” became a key 
source of constitutional legitimacy. For them, the process of “judicial 
globalization” was itself the sine qua non of the construction of judicial 
legitimacy.  
A feedback loop soon developed. After decades of sustained battering 
at home, which included major intellectual assaults on their use of 
substantive due process and equal protection to justify their assertiveness, 
American judges—and a wide array of political activists and legal 
academics interested for strategic reasons in the aggrandizement of 
American judicial power—began to see the opportunities in connecting 
themselves to this worldwide movement by tapping into its freshened 
wellsprings of legitimacy. The current intense interest of scholars in the 
role of judges worldwide is a direct outgrowth of this process. 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE NORMATIVE CASE FOR JUDICIAL GLOBALIZATION 
Until recently, these developments moved ahead relatively 
unselfconsciously and attracted precious little attention or criticism. 
Lately, however, this has changed.24 In response, a debate has begun to 
 23. See JENNIFER WIDNER, BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW (2001); GLOBAL EXPANSION OF 
JUDICIAL POWER, supra note 4; HIRSCHL, supra note 4. 
 24. See generally Bork, supra note 4; Kersch, supra note 1; Jed Rubenfeld, The Two World 
Orders, WILSON Q. 22 (2003); Donald E. Childress III, Using Comparative Constitutional Law to 
Resolve Domestic Federal Questions, 53 DUKE L.J. 193 (2003); Carlos F. Rosenkrantz, Against 
Constitutional Borrowings and Other Nonauthoritative Uses of Foreign Law, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 269 
(2003); Richard A. Posner, No Thanks, We Already Have Our Own Laws, LEGAL AFF., July–Aug. 
2004, at 40. See also Steve Lash, Supreme Court Citations to Foreign Law Rankle Scalia, CHI. DAILY 
L. BULL., July 22, 2004, at 1. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol4/iss2/6
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take shape. As this debate unfolds, the terms of the argument are 
becoming clear. And those favorable to judicial globalization are 
beginning to articulate defenses for this developing set of practices and 
perceived imperatives. 
Advocates of judicial globalization, who span an array of academic 
specialties, have defended the process on a number of grounds. To date, 
three have become most prominent. The first involves appeals to moral 
universalism. The second involves appeals to the refinement of technical 
and administrative competence. And the third involves appeals to 
diplomatic or foreign policy considerations.25 
The first set of appeals—those made on behalf of moral universalism—
are made chiefly by philosophers and philosophically-oriented legal and 
constitutional theorists. For many, the new legal transnationalism 
represents a promising new departure, a new constitutionalism for a new 
century. Kantian constitutional theory, as practiced most influentially by 
Ronald Dworkin, has long envisaged the interpretive process as involving, 
in its fundamentals, a debate about universal morals, or “the good.”26 This 
theory is essentially a philosophical conversation about the nature of 
justice and the good. Such a theory, at least in its fundamental orientation, 
has little need for constitutional boundaries, because the good (unlike the 
requirements of the U.S. constitutional text, more strictly construed) is 
universal. In this regard, there is no reason to limit participation in the 
conversation about the nature of the good to domestic actors. Within this 
seminar model of constitutional reasoning, which understands the 
constitutional assessments as akin to seminars in moral philosophy, the 
more thoughtful people who contribute to the conversation, the better.  
Indeed, the more voices heard in French or German, the better. Both 
countries, after all, have deep philosophical traditions; traditions, many 
would contend, that are much more august than that of the United States. 
To the extent that judges can enter into more conversations with a wider 
array of thinkers around the world about the nature of justice, fairness, 
liberty, and equality, the better off they (and we) will be. After all, by their 
very nature, such conversations are beneficial. Judges who are more 
thoughtful philosophically and more learned are preferable to judges who 
are less so.  
The second set of appeals for judicial globalization also trumpets the 
virtues of extending the circles of conversation. But rather than focusing 
 25. The arguments in particular writings do not always divide so hermetically. I offer this 
categorization as a useful way to isolate distinct conceptual arguments. 
 26. See, e.g., DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 21. 
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on philosophical questions involving the nature of the good, the second set 
of appeals is more technical, pragmatic, and problem-focused. This set 
emphasizes the virtues of having professional problem-solvers—judges—
learn from the technical competence of their fellow professionals 
operating in an increasingly interconnected world system.27 These 
justifications are offered most prominently by figures, such as Justice 
Breyer,28 who have a deep pragmatic orientation. These figures may, like 
Breyer, have extensive backgrounds in the design and implementation of 
effective, scientifically-sensitive regulatory regimes.29 Here, the virtues of 
looking abroad have less to do with philosophical debate than with data 
collection. Justice Breyer captured the essence of this justification: looking 
abroad is helpful because the experiences of other countries may “cast an 
empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a common 
legal problem.”30 
The third set of appeals for judicial globalization is diplomatic. Many 
scholars, particularly political scientists writing as scholars of international 
relations, see steps toward harmonization as an important form of effective 
diplomacy. One of the major divides in contemporary politics (at least as 
framed in popular political discourse) is between proponents of 
multilateralist and unilateralist approaches to foreign policy. Evidence of 
this divide includes the growing diplomatic gulf between Europe and 
America, a debate that has grown especially bitter in the aftermath of the 
Second Iraq War. These scholars argue that constitutional borrowing and 
allusions in Supreme Court opinions to foreign opinions, practices, and 
precedent help the Court convey respect to and cooperation with foreign 
 27. The notion that the judge’s role is defined by his abilities as a pragmatic problem-solver took 
flight at the time of the rise of the modern American administrative state. See R. JEFFREY LUSTIG, 
CORPORATE LIBERALISM: THE ORIGINS OF MODERN POLITICAL THEORY, 1890–1920, at 25 (1982). 
“[M]odern developments [change] the form of law, what fundamentally is. Rather than a settled 
framework of activity, rooted in precedent, known to citizens, and focused on the judicial individual, 
‘law’ becomes equated with changing policies and social purposes as defined by powerful groups. It 
also becomes the paradigmatic form of law in the modern state.” Id. See generally id., ch. 7; 
THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 
1979) (describing the evolving political system). See also MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. 
RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED 
AMERICA’S PRISONS 1–25, 348–49 (1998) (discussing the role of courts in the modern administrative 
state). 
 28. See Ken I. Kersch, The Synthetic Progressivism of Justice Stephen Breyer, in REHNQUIST 
JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE COURT DYNAMIC 241–76 (Earl Maltz ed., 2003) (discussing the nature 
of Justice Breyer’s pragmatism). 
 29. Id. See also CASS SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME 
COURT (1999). 
 30. J. Breyer, supra note 2, at 2. 
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governing institutions, particularly those in Europe.31 Recent statements by 
Justice O’Connor make clear that at least some of the Court’s justices 
consider themselves peacemakers in this regard, and increasingly see 
themselves as ambassadors doing their part, through judicial globalization, 
to improve the reputation of United States abroad.32 Such a self-
conception, among some members of a Court frequently noted for its 
attraction to aggrandizing its power,33 is a phenomenon worth noting in its 
own right. 
These diverse arguments in defense of judicial globalization can be 
isolated and debated individually and on their own terms, as is likely to 
happen in law journals, the popular press, and even Congress (which has 
already held hearings on these trends).34 From the broader perspective of 
the way ideas work in history, however, one gains a better sense of their 
likely influence by considering the arguments together, in the aggregate. 
Intellectual movements tend to take off when there are a multitude of 
arguments on their behalf swirling in public discourse. Such arguments 
will often be mutually inconsistent. Some will be highly visionary. Some 
will be relatively careful and sober. The sheer profusion of arguments 
heading in a single direction suggests a process in which the end is clear. 
It is worth noting that in the 1940s, the intellectual atmosphere 
surrounding these questions was strikingly similar to today’s intellectual 
atmosphere. At that time, as today, the perceived need for a diplomatic 
“new world order” and transnational convergence in service of more 
effective governance coincided with soaring visions of the imminence of a 
“world state” or “cosmopolis” and fevered intimations of moral, 
philosophic, and religious convergence and transcendence.35 When a 
 31. See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) (describing transnational 
networks through which government officials work to solve problems). 
 32. See, e.g., Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Remarks at the Southern Center for International 
Studies 2–3 (Oct. 28, 2003), at http://www.southerncenter.org/Oconner_transcript.pdf (last visited Jan. 
13, 2005). 
 33. See KECK, supra note 21. 
 34. See Jacobsohn, supra note 6, at 1764 n.12. 
 35. WAGAR, supra note 10, at 223. An additional way to world political integration is the 
“functionalist” approach, most closely identified in recent years [the 1940s] with David Mitrany . . . 
For the functionalist, the best hope for world order is through the proliferation and gradual interlocking 
of nonpolitical regional and international agencies . . . As [H.G.] Wells foresaw the new world order, it 
would not be a “state” at all, but something more like a world technocracy, managed by non-political 
experts. Mitrany and most other recent functionalists, while not going this far in their depreciation of 
politics and government, tend in a distinctly Wellsian direction. Id. at 223. See also H.G. WELLS, THE 
OUTLOOK FOR HOMO SAPIENS: AN UNEMOTIONAL STATEMENT OF THE THINGS THAT ARE HAPPENING 
TO HIM NOW, AND OF THE IMMEDIATE POSSIBILITIES CONFRONTING HIM (1942); SLAUGHTER, supra 
note 31. Religious transcendence was clearly part of this list in the 1940s. Today, as secularists have 
wrested control of intellectual life in Europe and the United States, it has been dropped from the list. 
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dynamic such as this is in full swing, the real interest among participants is 
less the end to be pursued than the most effective instrumental grounds on 
which to justify it.  
THE STRUCTURE OF JUDICIALIZED COSMOPOLITAN REVOLUTION: JUDGES 
AS QUASI-AUTONOMOUS COSMOPOLITAN ADMINISTRATORS 
To determine why so many intellectuals and scholars are passionate 
about the new transnationalism, it is most helpful to study it as a form of 
political ideology. Visionary articulations of the imminence of a world 
government and cosmopolitan citizenship and fevered descriptions of a 
world poised on the verge of moral and philosophical convergence and 
transcendence make for fascinating reading. And they can be found in 
abundance today in mainstream journals of law, political theory, and 
political science.36 However, the arguments most likely to influence public 
opinion of developments in this direction are not these evangelical works. 
Instead they are the arguments of scholars who, while often sharing these 
evangelical convictions, prefer to advance them through more strategic 
and pragmatic means. These scholars are now advancing a number of 
sober arguments in service of the same ends. 
The most reasonable justifications for judicial globalization have a 
heavily pragmatic and administrative caste. The most commonsensical 
justifications trumpet the advantages to American judges of gathering 
evidence from around the world, which improves the quality of their 
constitutional interpretations and problem-solving abilities. If other judges 
have reasoned about federalism and affirmative action, then why should 
American judges be ignorant of their thought-processes and decisions? 
Framing the question in this manner evinces a strong faith in judges’ 
abilities to act as expert administrators as part of a quasi-autonomous 
problem-solving class. As such, arguments of this sort repeat arguments 
made by the proponents of progressive government in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries in studies not of comparative law, but rather 
of comparative administration.37 That today these arguments are directed 
See generally WAGAR, supra note 10, 173–88. 
 36. For a brief overview, see KERSCH, supra note 2, at 343–48; Kersch, supra note 1. 
 37. See, e.g., Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197, 218–20 (1887). 
[I]t is necessary to see that for all governments alike the legitimate ends of administration are 
the same, in order not to be frightened at the idea of looking into foreign systems of 
administration for instruction and suggestion; in order to get rid of the apprehension that we 
might perchance blindly borrow something incompatible with our principles. That man is 
blindly astray who denounces attempts to transplant foreign systems into this country. It is 
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toward judges is a further sign of the ever-increasing governing 
pretensions of judges. 
Interestingly, the scholars who have argued judicial globalization as an 
imperative, by framing the issue as one involving the development of 
pragmatic and professional administrative expertise, have provided us with 
keen insights into the process by which, empirically and politically, a truly 
globalized judiciary is likely to come about. While this may not have been 
a wise political move by scholars who favor this process, it is insightful 
nonetheless. This scholarship suggests that if the newly globalizing 
judiciary is best seen as a process in which judges around the world are 
working together transnationally to hone their performance, abilities, and 
impossible: they simply would not grow here. But why should we not use such parts of 
foreign contrivances as we want, if they be in any way serviceable? We are in no danger of 
using them in a foreign way. We borrowed rice, but we do not eat it with chopsticks. We 
borrowed our whole political language from England, but we leave the words “king” and 
“lords” out of it. What did we ever originate, except the action of the federal government 
upon individuals and some of the functions of the federal supreme court? 
 We can borrow the science of administration with safety and profit if only we read all 
fundamental differences of condition into its essential tenets. We have only to filter it through 
our constitutions, only to put it over a slow fire of criticism and distill away its foreign gases. 
 I know there is a sneaking fear in some conscientiously patriotic minds that studies of 
European systems might signalize some foreign methods as better than some American 
methods; and the fear is easily to be understood. But it would scarcely be avowed in just any 
company. 
 It is the more necessary to insist upon thus putting away all prejudices against looking 
anywhere in the world but at home for suggestions in this study, because nowhere else in the 
whole field of politics, it would seem, can we make use of the historical, comparative method 
more safely than in this province of administration. Perhaps the more novel the forms we 
study the better we shall sooner learn the peculiarities of our own methods. We can never 
learn either our own weaknesses or our own virtues by comparing ourselves with ourselves. 
We are too used to the appearance and procedure of our own system to see its true 
significance. 
 Let it be noted that it is the distinction . . . between administration and politics which 
makes the comparative method so safe in the field of administration. When we study the 
administrative systems of France and Germany, knowing we are not in search of political 
principles, we need not care a peppercorn for the constitutional or political reasons which 
Frenchmen or Germans give for their practices when explaining them to us. If I see a 
murderous fellow sharpening a knife cleverly, I can borrow his way of sharpening the knife 
without borrowing his probable intention to commit murder with it; and so, if I see a 
monarchist dyed in the wool managing a public bureau well, I can learn his business methods 
without changing one of my republican spots. He may serve his king; I will continue to serve 
the people; but I should like to serve my sovereign as well as he serves his . . . . [B]y studying 
administration as a means of putting our own politics into convenient practice, . . . we are on 
perfectly safe ground, and can learn without error what foreign systems have to teach us. . . . 
We can thus scrutinize the anatomy of foreign governments without fear of getting any of 
their diseases into our veins; dissect alien systems without apprehension of blood-poisoning. 
Id. (emphasis original). As the chief proponent of the League of Nations, Wilson, of course, was a 
leader in the movement for global administration. See JOHN MILTON COOPER, JR., BREAKING THE 
HEART OF THE WORLD: WOODROW WILSON AND THE FIGHT FOR THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (2001). 
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expertise, it may be instructive to consider the processes by which 
administrators who are not judges do the same thing. 
Recent work by influential political scientists has improved our 
understanding of these processes. Studies of the construction of 
administrative autonomy suggest that, to succeed in consolidating their 
authority and autonomy, judges will need to work effectively in ways 
similar to those in which “bureaucratic entrepreneurs” have succeeded in 
analogous endeavors by building political coalitions, publicizing their 
accomplishments, and grounding their authority in appeals to problem-
solving expertise. Analogously, these judges will also need to proceed 
gradually. “[B]ureaucrats who value their autonomy,” Daniel Carpenter 
has written, 
will act in measured ways to preserve it, refraining from strategies 
of consistent fiat or defiance . . . [B]ureaucratic autonomy lies less 
in fiat than in leverage. Autonomy prevails when agencies [and, 
increasingly, judges] can establish political legitimacy—a 
reputation for expertise, efficiency, or moral protection and a 
uniquely diverse complex of ties to organized interests and the 
media—and induce politicians to defer to the wishes of the agency 
when they prefer otherwise.38 
With respect to the emerging globalized judiciary, scholars have 
described a process that looks very much like that of bureaucratic 
formation at work among judges around the world. In charting the 
development of transnational judicial networks and support structures, 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello, and Stepan Wood have 
suggested that “a wide range of possibilities exist for strengthening formal 
and informal links between international and domestic institutions in ways 
that blur the distinction between international and domestic law.”39 As this 
process develops, she and her co-authors add, “it is possible that domestic 
institutions will become more interested in and receptive to their 
counterpart international institutions as they begin to perform the same 
functions horizontally rather than vertically.”40  
 38. DANIEL P. CARPENTER, THE FORGING OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY: REPUTATIONS, 
NETWORKS, AND POLICY INNOVATIONS IN EXECUTIVE AGENCIES, 1862–1928, at 9, 14 (2001). See 
also HIRSCHL, supra note 4, at 213–18. 
 39. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello, & Stepan Wood, International Law and 
International Relations Theory: A New Generation of Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INT. L. 
367, 391 (1998). 
 40. Id. at 392. 
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And, indeed, this is precisely what they observe happening among 
judges. “[D]omestic judges, at least in the United States,” they add, “are 
beginning to articulate their responsibility to ‘help the world’s legal 
systems work together, in harmony, rather than at cross purposes.’ Such 
cooperation includes not only procedural mechanisms of deference and 
collaboration, but also substantive evaluation of the degree of convergence 
between domestic and foreign law.”41 This cooperation has been made 
possible by “a deep sense of participation in a common global enterprise 
of judging.”42 “It [involves],” Slaughter asserts, “a vision of a global 
community of law, established not by the World Court in The Hague, but 
by national courts working together around the world.”43 “Constitutional 
cross-fertilization,” as Slaughter calls it, is a crucial part of this trend.44 
The construction of governing autonomy by judges worldwide depends 
heavily upon the effective cultivation of a political support structure. “A 
flood of foundation and government funding for judicial seminars, training 
programs, and educational materials under the banner of ‘rule of law’ 
programs has significantly expanded the opportunities for cross-
fertilization,” Slaughter writes.45 “Equally important, however,” she adds, 
“is a growing sense of participation in a common enterprise, backed up by 
the growing opportunities for face-to-face meeting among judges . . . ,” 
where “judicial networks” are forged.46 “All this activity,” she emphasizes, 
from the most passive form of cross-fertilization to the most active 
cooperation in dispute resolution, requires recognition of 
participation in a common judicial enterprise, independent of the 
content and constraints of specific national and international legal 
systems. It requires that judges see one another not only as servants 
or even representatives of a particular government or polity, but as 
fellow professionals in a profession that transcends national 
borders.47 
Judges, Slaughter makes clear, “are remarkably self-conscious about 
what they are doing” as they participate in “the self-conscious construction 
 41. Id. at 392 (quoting Howe v. Goldcorp Inv., Ltd., 946 F.2d 944, 950 (1st Cir. 1991) (J. 
Breyer)). 
 42. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT. L. 1103, 1104 (2004). 
 43. Id. at 1114. 
 44. Id. at 1116–19. 
 45. Id. at 1117. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. at 1124. 
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of a global judicial community.”48 “Increasing cross-fertilization of ideas 
and precedents among constitutional judges around the world is gradually 
giving rise to a visible international consensus on various issues—a 
consensus that, in turn, carries compelling weight.”49 Through the 
construction of “courts as quasi-autonomous actors in the international 
system,”50 courts may not be able to create and administer “a formal global 
legal system,” but she concludes, it “may be as close as it is possible to 
come.”51 
“Transnational civil society,” an agglomeration of advocacy groups 
analogous to the one that sprung up around American judges in the 
aftermath of Brown, has proved crucial to the efforts of judges worldwide 
to construct themselves as a self-consciously powerful, quasi-autonomous 
governing class.52 These groups, including non-governmental 
organizations or NGOs, in conjunction with transnational social 
movements and with the financial backing of private and public 
contributors, now “undertake voluntary collective action across state 
borders in pursuit of what they deem the wider public interest.”53 Altering 
“the structures of power and meaning,” including the ways that actors 
within governmental institutions—like judges—understand their 
governing roles, is a major part of their portfolio.54 
Richard Price, drawing from the more narrowly focused studies of 
others, has distilled a taxonomy of the types of transnational political 
activities that these advocacy networks undertake to change domestic and 
international policy and institutions.55 First, they work to set agendas by 
 48. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 191, 195–96 
(2003). 
 49. Id. at 202. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Slaughter, supra note 48, at 218. 
 52. Richard Price, Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics, 55 WORLD POL. 
579, 579 (2003). See generally Tamir Moustafa, Law Versus the State: The Judicialization of Politics 
in Egypt, 28 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 883 (2003); EPP, supra note 20; HIRSCHL, supra note 4.  
 53. Price, supra note 52, at 580. 
 54. Id. at 583. See also Harold Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International 
Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623 (1988) (discussing how nations obey international law). 
 55. Price, supra note 52, at 584. The books from which Price draws from are SUSAN 
BURGERMAN, MORAL VICTORIES: HOW ACTIVISTS PROVOKE MULTILATERAL ACTION (2001); ANN 
MARIE CLARK, DIPLOMACY OF CONSCIENCE: AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL AND CHANGING HUMAN 
RIGHTS NORMS (2001); MATTHEW EVANGELISTA, UNARMED FORCES: THE TRANSNATIONAL 
MOVEMENT TO END THE COLD WAR (1999); THE THIRD FORCE: THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL 
SOCIETY (Ann Florini ed., 2000); NON-STATE ACTORS AND AUTHORITY IN THE GLOBAL SYSTEM 
(Richard Higgott et al. eds., 2000), MARGARET KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND 
BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998); RESTRUCTURING WORLD 
POLITICS: TRANSNATIONAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, NETWORKS, AND NORMS (Sanjeeu Khagram et al. 
eds., 2002). 
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“identifying a problem of international concern and providing 
information.”56 Second, they propose solutions in light of that agenda by 
“creating norms or recommending policy change.”57 Third, they construct 
political support for this policy change transnationally by “building 
networks and coalitions of allies.”58 And, fourth, they implement the 
changes by “employing tactics of persuasion and pressure to change 
practices and/or encourage compliance with norms.” All of these activities 
are now routinely aimed at domestic judges deciding domestic cases in 
constitutional democracies around the world. Within the United States, 
domestic political actors with clearly articulated—typically liberal—policy 
objectives have made common cause with these transnational movements, 
and have sought to augment their influence upon American judges.59 
For those involved in pushing this endeavor in the face of democratic 
resistance or indifference, preserving “the mask” of law is essential.60 The 
most effective way of proceeding is by working incrementally off-shore, 
quietly creating new “norms” and “laws” through small insertions of 
language into international declarations and other documents.61 The next 
step is to appeal to these norms and laws in arguments made before judges 
around the world eager to sign up as participants in the new “global 
consensus” and “global governance” project. 
 56. Price, supra note 52, at 584. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. In many respects, this dynamic is simply a move in a classic political game, involving effort 
by the losing side to broaden the scope of the conflict by welcoming into the ring like-minded players 
from abroad. See generally E.E. SCHATTSNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALISTS VIEW 
OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (1960); RABKIN, supra note 5 (describing the reach of international law); 
Ken I. Kersch, The Semi-Sovereign People, Paper Presented at the Conference on the Declaration of 
Independence, James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions, Princeton University 
(Apr. 2002) (on file with author). Additional evidence of the link between the transnational turn and 
liberal policy goals is that the “take-off” in the current turn toward transnationalism was coincident 
with the rise to power in Western democracies of left-of-center governments. Price, supra note 52, at 
593.  
 Moreover, international relations scholar, Andrew Moravcsik, has demonstrated that, while the 
domestic public policy agenda supported in substance by the emerging transnational order and 
movement do not align with partisan divides in Europe, they track closely those within the United 
States, with transnationalism tied to a Democratic Party policy agenda and opposition tied to that of 
the Republicans. Andrew Moravcsik, Why is U.S. Human Rights Policy So Unilateralist?, in THE 
COST OF ACTING ALONE: MULTILATERALISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 345 (Patrick Stewart & 
Shepard Forman eds., 2002). See also Jeffrey Rosen, Supreme Mistake: How the Election Affects the 
Court, the New Republic (Nov. 8, 2004); Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Constitutional Borrowing and 
Non-Borrowing, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 196 (2003). 
 60. Slaughter & Mattli, supra note 22, at 72. 
 61. Price, supra note 52, at 584. See RABKIN, supra note 5. 
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A recently leaked legal policy memo of the International Legal 
Program (ILP) of the Center for Reproductive Rights (CRP), a pro-
abortion transnational advocacy group, discusses the organization’s modus 
operandi. The group’s self-declared “overarching goal” is “to ensure that 
governments worldwide guarantee reproductive [i.e. abortion] rights out of 
an understanding that they are legally bound to do so. We see two 
principal prerequisites for achieving this goal: (1) strengthening 
international reproductive rights norms . . . [and] (2) [c]onsistent and 
effective action on the part of civil society and the international 
community to enforce these norms.”62 There is, however, no 
internationally recognized norm protecting abortion as a basic 
reproductive right. The CRP calls this a “normative gap.”63 Eliminating 
this gap  
involves developing a jurisprudence that pushes the general 
understanding of existing, broadly accepted human rights law to 
encompass reproductive rights. Such a jurisprudence is developed 
within a globalized judiciary primarily through: Report[ing] to the 
treaty monitoring bodies; bring[ing] cases to international and 
regional adjudicative bodies; [and] bring[ing] claims based on 
international law to national level courts.64 
As for the strategy of proceeding by “piggybacking”—persuading 
judges to adopt, in conjunction with their fellow professionals worldwide, 
expansive interpretations of clearly articulated “hard” norms—the CRP 
calculated as follows: 
There are several advantages to relying primarily on interpretations 
of hard norms. As interpretations of norms acknowledging 
reproductive rights are repeated in international bodies, the 
legitimacy of these rights is reinforced. In addition, the gradual 
nature of this approach ensures that we are never in an “all-or-
nothing” situation, where we may risk a major setback. Further, it is 
a strategy that does not require a major, concentrated investment of 
resources, but rather it can be achieved over time with regular use of 
staff time and funds. Finally, there is a stealth quality to the work: 
we are achieving incremental recognition of values without a huge 
amount of scrutiny from the opposition. These lower profile 
 62. 149 Cong. Rec. E2534-E2535 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 2003) (statement of Rep. Smith). 
 63. Id. at E2537. 
 64. Id. 
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victories will gradually put us in a strong position to assert a broad 
consensus around our assertions.65 
As such interpretations proliferate, they become more concrete. Assuming 
the status of norms through the consensus of the relevant actors, they 
become legitimized. 
THE GLOBALIZED JUDICIARY: THE DEVELOPING NORMATIVE DEBATE 
So far, this essay has discussed the transnational turn in constitutional 
law and, in particular, the emerging imperative of a globalized judiciary, 
primarily as historical and political—that is, empirical—phenomena. In 
questions of law (and politics more generally), however, normative 
arguments concerning what should be done affect the empirical outcome 
of what actually is done. Normative arguments are component parts of 
empirical phenomena. Both for this reason, and because it has implications 
for the project of constitutional self-government in the United States in the 
future, those arguments are worth describing and evaluating. 
This discussion does not aspire to be comprehensive. The transnational 
turn in law, which is to be abetted by an increasingly globalized judiciary, 
is a multifaceted phenomenon. The legal arguments for the turn, to say 
nothing of the prudential and political ones, are varied, highly technical, 
and proliferating. Each is debated on its own terms in lengthy law review 
articles, and each is devoted to a single subject or point of entry. Those 
who are interested in detailed discussions regarding the establishment of 
universal jurisdiction; the greater empowerment of transnational and 
supranational courts; a more robust reading of treaty obligations by 
national courts; a ratcheted-up level of “constitutional borrowing;” fidelity 
to the law of nations (including customary international law); greater 
attentiveness to “global norms;” increased deference to “global public 
opinion;” and, generally speaking, an increased recognition by judges of 
all types at all levels that their jobs are “no longer a domestic enterprise,” 
with each issue treated in isolation from the others, should recur to these 
articles.66 
 65. Id. at E2538 (emphasis added); Price, supra note 52, at 584. 
 66. See Peter J. Spiro, Who’s Afraid of Global Courts?, Paper Presented at the Workshop on The 
Promises and Pitfalls of International Courts, Bellagio, Italy (May 19–24, 2003). For an illustration of 
how these diverse questions are treated in contemporary progressive political discussions as part of a 
single imperative, see Symposium, Bringing Human Rights Home: Why Universal Rights Protect 
America, AM. PROSPECT (Oct. 2004). 
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The brief discussion that follows is limited to considering the question 
raised most directly by the Supreme Court’s Lawrence and Grutter (and 
the recent Roper v. Simmons) decisions: whether the U.S. Supreme Court 
should look abroad more extensively when thinking through its future 
constitutional rulings. In some cases, doing so might be described as 
“constitutional borrowing,” but in others it is simply a question of 
heightened cosmopolitanism or awareness by American judges. This 
discussion will raise some general themes that may be applicable to our 
understanding and contextualization of the wide variety of more narrowly 
focused technical debates. I will begin by briefly isolating the two chief 
claims that have been made on behalf of this trend. The first claim is that it 
is a historical imperative, given the more general process of globalization 
that is taking place around the world. The second claim is that it improves 
the quality of judicial decisionmaking. This essay will then address a set of 
criticisms of these developments (and answers to them) that have received 
less attention to date than they deserve. 
WHY AN INCREASINGLY GLOBALIZED AMERICAN JUDICIARY IS A 
WELCOME DEVELOPMENT 
Some have argued that the trends evidenced in Lawrence, Grutter, and 
Roper are imperative in light of the inexorable historical process—the 
historical destiny—of globalization. American judges, this argument goes, 
are only a small part of these world-historical developments, and they 
necessarily must find their proper place within them. If they do not, our 
judges risk being left behind by the sweep of history.67 One form of this 
argument takes the globalization of American judges to be a foreign policy 
imperative in an increasingly globalized world. Sage American judges 
should understand that, when others are borrowing from you, your 
decision not to return the favor by borrowing from them amounts to a 
diplomatic snub. And good judges will work diplomatically to improve 
America’s image abroad rather than to mar it.68 In a similar vein, a nation 
 67. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Courting the World, FOREIGN POL’Y, Mar.–Apr. 2004, at 78. 
 68. Jonathan Ringel, O’Connor Speech Puts Foreign Law Center Stage, FULTON COUNTY DAILY 
REP., Oct. 31, 2003, at 1, available at Westlaw, 10/31/2003 Daily Rep. (Fulton County) 1; Wiktor 
Osiatynski, Paradoxes of Constitutional Borrowing, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 244, 245 (2003). It should be 
noted that, broadly speaking, although the contemporary institutional context is radically different, this 
is not a new concern. The early Supreme Court under John Marshall took seriously their obligations, 
as a representative of a nation new to the world system, to issue decisions in line with the law of 
nations. See R. KENT NEWMEYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME COURT 
272–91 (2001). Marshall, however, was dealing exclusively with traditional matters of international 
law such as seizures of ships as prizes and the treatment of ambassadors. He was not advocating 
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with an outward-looking judiciary shows the world that its government, as 
represented by its judges, is not unilateralist or isolationist, but is a 
“player” in the global game. Globalizing its judiciary is a manifestation of 
a government’s adherence to the same restrictions on (or aggrandizements 
of) governmental power as other members of the club of legitimate 
governments around the world.69 
A different class of justifications for a globalized judiciary has pointed 
to the wealth of information that a willingness to look abroad can bring to 
a judge’s decisionmaking process. The argument here is simply that more 
information is better than less. “A good idea is still a good idea,” Anne-
Marie Slaughter says, “even if it comes from France.”70 The benefits are 
even stronger to the extent that one is convinced that key features of 
constitutional government are either widespread or universal. So, for 
example, if principles of subsidiarity and proportionality are inherent in 
both the U.S. and foreign constitutions, then judges in the United States 
will benefit from knowing how their foreign counterparts have grappled 
with those principles and dealt effectively with concrete problems of 
governance. The benefit is likely to be greater (and, hence, more justified) 
when a judge’s domestic legal system bears a genealogical relationship to 
the foreign legal system from which he hopes to learn.71 More information 
is better than less for a number of reasons: it is an aid to both standard and 
aspirational interpretation aimed at moral improvement—making 
imperfect constitutions the best that they can be—as well as to the 
problem-solving process.72  
OBJECTIONS TO AND DEFENSES OF THE NEW TRANSNATIONALISM IN THE 
AMERICAN JUDICIARY 
Some scholars have raised serious questions about many of these 
justifications, and about the propriety of constitutional borrowing more 
generally. One set of arguments against borrowing raises the question of 
whether constitutional borrowing is truly “constitutional” at all in the 
“constitutional borrowing.” 
 69. Osiatynski, supra note 68, at 249; Rosenkrantz, supra note 24, at 281. 
 70. Martin S. Flaherty, Judicial Globalization in the Service of Self-Government, Paper Presented 
at the Program in Law and Public Affairs, Princeton University 12 n.43 (Apr. 12, 2004), available at 
http://www.law.columbia.edu/center_program/legal_theory/papers/fall04?exclusive=filemgr.download
&file_id=94190&rtcontentdisposition=filename%3DFlahertyCLS.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2004). 
 71. See Vicki Jackson, Yes Please, I’d Love to Talk With You, LEGAL AFF., July–Aug. 2004, at 
43; Choudhry, supra note 6, at 838; Rosenkrantz, supra note 24, at 278. 
 72. Jackson, supra note 71; J. Breyer, supra note 2; Jacobsohn, supra note 6. 
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traditional American sense of the term. In other words, the argument 
illuminates the failure of borrowing’s proponents to be explicit about the 
implicit theories of constitutional government upon which their 
recommendations rest.  
Seth Kreimer, for example, has identified three operative models of 
constitutionalism that are implicitly—but, often, not self-consciously—
invoked in the constitutional borrowing debates. The first is the “operating 
systems” model, which conceives of a constitution as something like a 
computer operating system—that is, as a program designed to serve its 
users by achieving with maximum efficiency the best that government can 
offer. In this model, the central questions are instrumental. Will confining 
our knowledge to our own borders bring us the best results in the most 
direct way? Or might a robust engagement with the universe of 
constitutional mechanisms, regardless of their provenance, be a better way 
of improving our system? In its most sensible forms, this model counsels 
prudence in constitutional borrowing. It allows that efforts to transport an 
operating system, or parts of one, from one institutional environment to 
another may or may not be successful, depending upon the particulars of 
the cases and circumstances.73 
The second model of constitutionalism is a moral model, which 
understands it as “a series of moral conceptions that constitute the best 
account of moral ideals by which a society should be guided.”74 While the 
operating systems model is anchored in a policy instrumentalism, the 
moral model is grounded in an ethical or philosophical universalism. This 
model presumes both that “best” answers to moral questions—chiefly 
those involving civil liberties and civil rights (or, in the transnational 
idiom, “human rights” or “human values”)—are possible, and that it is the 
job of judges in interpreting their domestic constitution to make good faith 
efforts to arrive at the “best” answers to these universal questions.75 
Looking abroad, while hardly determinative, is helpful to judges in this 
endeavor. If the rest of the world’s western liberal democracies have 
eliminated their death penalties, for example, it might imply that the 
United States is wrong about a fundamental moral question—whose 
correct answer is presumed to be implicit in the American constitutional 
tradition.76 
 73. Seth F. Kreimer, Invidious Comparisons: Some Cautionary Remarks on the Process of 
Constitutional Borrowing, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 640 (1999). 
 74. Id. at 640. 
 75. Id. at 645–46. See DWORKIN, supra note 21; Jacobsohn, supra note 6. 
 76. See generally Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 
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The third model of constitutionalism, while not necessarily exclusive of 
the other two, places significant emphasis on a nation’s constitution as the 
foundation of its national identity and as the touchstone of its civic 
religion or civic nationalism. According to this model, what a nation is as 
a people is defined by its commitment to a common and unique 
constitutional culture. This model, many have noted, is particularly 
powerful in the United States, which has a unique (and uniquely 
successful) history of civic nationalism anchored in a single, written 
constitutional text.77 
MEETING THE TECHNICAL COMPETENCE ARGUMENT 
Many have argued that judges are not particularly well-suited to the 
calibration of effective operating systems through constitutional 
borrowing. Intertwined as they are with long histories and unique cultural 
and institutional environments, living constitutions are enormously 
complex, organic things. For this reason, scholars have argued that efforts 
at constitutional functionalism undertaken by judges “may founder on 
problems associated with identifying functions and the institutions that 
perform them in different legal systems.”78 In such a context, the danger of 
botched translations is severe. Thoughtful comparative work has shown 
that this can be the case even when the desirability of the function, stated 
abstractly, is unimpeachable—such as “judicial independence.”79 
It may be, given the diversity and complexity of successful 
constitutional cultures, that “it is possible to conceive of many different 
yet equally reasonable ways to address each area of constitutional 
concern.”80 Moreover, because they are essentially technocratic, defenses 
of constitutional borrowing anchored in the operating systems model 
cannot make any useful distinction between common law borrowings 
(whether across countries or across American states) familiar in U.S. legal 
history and transnational constitutional borrowings. All involve “problem 
solving” and, as such, encourage the gathering of more information rather 
304 (2002); Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005); Harold Hongju Koh, Paying “Decent Respect” 
to World Opinion on the Death Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1085 (2002). 
 77. Kreimer, supra note 73, at 648–49 (stating, “[u]nlike many other politics, we have had only 
one constitution over the course of our national history.”); Jed Rubenfeld, The Two World Orders, 
WILSON Q. (Aug. 2003) (distinguishing between international and American constitutionalism). 
 78. Mark Tushnet, Returning with Interest: Observations on Some Putative Benefits of Studying 
Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 325, 327 (1999). 
 79. See Osiatynski, supra note 68, at 264–65 (discussing the principle of “Judicial 
Independence”). 
 80. Rosenkrantz, supra note 24, at 282. 
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than less, regardless of the source. But, of course, in terms of legitimate 
sources of authority, requirements of the rule of law, and the institutional 
role of judges, common law borrowing and constitutional borrowing are 
not at all the same. Judicial uses and interpretations of extra-jurisdictional 
common law are amendable through ordinary legislative processes. 
Constitutional borrowings, by contrast, stand above legislative revision, 
and are amendable only through supermajoritarian processes.  
In addition, despite the vague mood of “diversity” surrounding 
borrowing, proponents are actually troubled by the prospect of diverse 
opinions, world views, and approaches to governance. Judges excited by 
the potential of borrowing from others will have a strong tendency to 
undervalue diverse forms of liberal, democratic constitutional governance 
and will, ironically, work in the interest of diversity toward convergence.81 
To be sure, a diversity of legal cultures may be undesirable when some of 
those cultures are non-constitutional and non-liberal. But in liberal states, 
true diversity may simply be a sign of the vibrancy and well-developed 
state of domestic constitutional cultures. For this reason, in advanced 
liberal states with long histories of constitutional government, borrowing 
may be simply unnecessary.82 On the other hand, in relatively new, still 
developing liberal states, too great an enthusiasm for borrowing on the 
part of judges and scholars may work to stifle the development of a richly 
organic indigenous constitutional culture that will provide future 
generations with the deepest and most stable foundation for constitutional 
self-government.83 
Viewed in strictly technical terms, there are plausible arguments to be 
made that the difficulties presented to judges by the call to engage in more 
comparative work and more constitutional borrowing in reaching their 
decisions are not of a greater magnitude than the other interpretive 
difficulties they face on a daily basis. The problem of translation, some 
will rightly argue, is inherent in the judicial role.84 Judges are constantly 
 81. Id. at 279 (arguing that “multiplicity and divergence are not necessarily an evil when they 
occur in different jurisdictions.”). 
 82. Alexander Somek, The Deadweight of Formulae: What Might Have Been the Second 
Germanization of American Equal Protection Review, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 284 (1998). 
 83. Rosencrantz, supra note 24, at 294 (arguing that using foreign law hampers the development 
of a constitutional culture); Yasuo Hasebe, Constitutional Borrowing and Political Theory, 1 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 224, 232 (2003). 
 84. See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity And Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1365, 1371 (1997); 
Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 1191 (1993) (discussing the link 
between translation and legal interpretation); Lawrence Lessig, Understanding Changed Readings: 
Fidelity and Theory, 47 STAN. L. REV. 395 (1995) (arguing that the courts of necessity change 
meanings and values in interpretation). 
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called upon to consider the texts, precedents, and experiences of the past 
and to give them a current meaning that is faithful to their earlier meaning 
under the altered legal, historical, and political conditions of the present.  
Space travel, Mark Graber has suggested, may not be all that different 
from time travel.85 To be sure, judicial forays into space travel require that 
judges have the ability to understand the social, political, and legal 
systems of other countries. We may think that judges are not likely to be 
very good at this. But, we have no reason to believe that the judges’ 
understanding of their own system, particularly as it pertains to history, is 
especially good.86 Even if we give American judges the benefit of the 
doubt with regard to their successes as time travelers within the American 
constitutional tradition, we could say their successes in this regard are due 
to sound training and experience. If we want judges to do a better job at 
space travel, then we simply need to do a better job at offering more 
courses in comparative constitutionalism. A generation of lawyers and 
judges with better training in comparative and international law than that 
provided to previous generations is likely to do a much better job of 
engaging in persuasive and successful comparative analysis. As American 
law schools are now making major efforts to turn legal education in 
precisely this direction, the prospects for more successful space travel are 
improving every day.  
Ultimately, the real question is not whether it is good to look abroad or 
not, but rather whether, in a particular case, it is done well or done poorly. 
When the Court looked around the world to totalitarianism, it moved to 
make sure that, within the limits of its power, nothing like that would 
happen here. It may have successfully influenced the Court’s criminal 
process jurisprudence in stimulating a renewed appreciation for the 
proprieties of basic due process in race cases coming out of the segregated 
South. Because at least some of the Court’s justices, however, with the 
aim of preventing totalitarian “mind control,” began an aggressive assault 
on religious influence in education, particularly Roman Catholic 
education, as part of its Establishment Clause jurisprudence, we may be 
considerably more dubious about the inclination.87  
 85. I am grateful to Graber for raising this issue during his comments on an earlier version of this 
paper at the Conference on Global Constitutionalism at the University of Toronto, cited at this essay’s 
outset. 
 86. See generally Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 523, 524 (1995) (stating that judges are drawn to using history, but their work is often 
“replete” with problems). 
 87. See generally KERSCH, supra note 2, at 94–96, 292–325; RICHARD PRIMUS, THE AMERICAN 
LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS 224–33 (1999); John T. McGreevy, Thinking on One’s Own: Catholicism in the 
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Were the Court to look abroad to Europe’s free speech jurisprudence, 
particularly as it concerns matters of “hate speech,” it would trouble many 
who value the Court’s recent expansive readings of free speech 
protections. Some critical race scholars and feminists, however, would 
welcome a more cosmopolitan turn in this area of the law. Justice Breyer’s 
more purposive understanding of the judicial role leads him to believe that 
in federalism cases, for example, it is instructive to look to the experiences 
of others for guidance in achieving our own constitutional goals and 
purposes.88 Those of a more formalist inclination, like Justice Scalia, have 
rejected that understanding.89 Again, ultimately, the question is not 
whether to look abroad in the abstract, but rather whether looking abroad 
is done well for legitimate ends, or poorly, for illegitimate ones. As much 
as we may look abroad, the debate is still, in the last analysis, conducted 
on our own terms. 
If the Court’s current interest in transnational consultation and 
increasing cosmopolitanism were taking place in a historical and 
intellectual vacuum, these technical arguments might be fairly convincing. 
However, the current interest in these matters is not taking place in a 
vacuum and is fueled by a belief among many prominent intellectuals, 
both in the United States and around the world, that the U.S. Constitution, 
is outmoded and badly designed, and that a “globalized judiciary” should 
work to update and re-design it.  
There is a belief that the United States is a global laggard in many 
policy respects and that a “globalized judiciary” should play a role in 
bringing it up to date. Additionally, there is a belief that the U.S. 
Constitution, with its stubborn belief in sovereignty, is a constitutional 
laggard as well, and that a “globalized judiciary” can work to transcend 
this.90 In this ideological and political context, it is not true that a 
cosmopolitan turn in American constitutional law can only be discussed in 
narrow, and highly legalist and technical terms. In light of recent and quite 
academically popular calls for broadening the terms of constitutional 
discourse and debate, resistance to moving this discussion beyond its 
technical, legalistic vacuum, seems very odd indeed.91 
American Intellectual Imagination, 1928–1960, 84 J. AM. HIST. 97, 122 (1997). 
 88. See Kersch, supra note 28. 
 89. For an example of Justice Scalia’s strict interpretation, see, for example, Printz v. United 
States, 521 U.S. 898, 905 (1997). 
 90. See KERSCH, supra note 2, at 348–49. 
 91. See, e.g., KRAMER, supra note 14; TUSHNET, supra note 19. 
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It does not follow from the observation that the process of translation is 
a necessary and routine concomitant of judging that the process, 
undertaken in certain contexts and in a certain spirit, cannot serve as a 
critical adjunct to the process of revolutionizing constitutional thought. 
The key political and constitutional theorists of the Progressive Era, 
Herbert Croly and Woodrow Wilson, both spoke of what they clearly saw 
as transformative and, indeed, revolutionary new thinking in terms of 
translation. In the classic progressive statement of “The New 
Nationalism,” The Promise of American Life, which became the anchor of 
Theodore Roosevelt’s governing political philosophy, Herbert Croly 
argued that, in a context in which “underlying social and economic 
conditions are themselves changing,” a simple fidelity “to traditional ways 
of behavior, standards, and ideals” would no longer be sufficient to realize 
“the promise of American life.”92 Under these conditions, a rigid, 
fatalistic, and conservative fidelity would be stifling rather than fulfilling. 
The solution, Croly famously argued, was to find new means for achieving 
what, in a broad sense, were considered the traditional ends.93 Croly’s call 
for the pursuit in modern America of Jeffersonian ends through the 
Hamiltonian means of a newly empowered, activist central state was an 
appeal for translation.94 In many respects, his call was heeded, and a 
revolution in American government, and American constitutionalism, was 
at hand.95 
Woodrow Wilson, a constitutional scholar and (in conjunction with his 
advisor Louis D. Brandeis) the chief articulator of the alternative 
transformational progressive vision, “The New Freedom,” spoke of a 
process that involved both revolution and translation simultaneously. 
Wilson asserted: “We are upon the eve of a great reconstruction. It calls 
for creative statesmanship as no age has done since that great age in which 
we set up the government under which we live.”96 In the years to come, 
Wilson prognosticated, “revolution will come in peaceful guise, as it came 
when we put aside the crude government of the Confederation and created 
the great Federal Union which governs individuals, not States . . .”97 At the 
 92. HERBERT CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE 5 (Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. ed., 1965) 
(1908). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 17. 
 95. Id. See also STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF 
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877–1920 (1997). 
 96. WOODROW WILSON, THE NEW FREEDOM: A CALL FOR THE EMANCIPATION OF THE 
GENEROUS ENERGIES OF A PEOPLE 32 (William E. Leuchtenburg ed., 1961) (1914). 
 97. Id. 
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same time, he declared, “I am not one of those who wish to break 
connection with the past . . .”98 “If I did not believe that to be progressive 
was to preserve the essentials of our institution, I for one could not be a 
progressive.”99 The Declaration of Independence, he affirmed, was a great 
document. But “the Declaration of Independence did not mention the 
questions of our day. It is of no consequence to us unless we can translate 
its general terms into examples of the present day . . .”100 “Unless we can 
translate it into the questions of our own day, we are not worthy of it.”101 
In effectuating this translation, Louis D. Brandeis famously argued that 
there needed to be a revolution in the sorts of evidence to which courts 
were willing to listen. A judicial opinion, he asserted, “derives its 
authority, just as law derives its existence, from all the facts of life. The 
judge is free to draw upon these facts wherever he can find them, if only 
they are helpful.”102 
In light of this history, we must take care not to make the mistake of 
assuming that because translation is a routine part of what judges do that 
there is something inherent in the process of translation that makes it 
routine. In the Progressive Era, a large number of intellectuals called for a 
broad-ranging project of translation in service of revolutionary, 
transformational purposes. A similar intellectual movement is currently 
pushing for a new commitment to transnational translation by the 
American judiciary.103 Informed discussion of the new transnationalism 
must consider this broader intellectual and political context. 
THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT 
Constitutional borrowing may be particularly problematic for the 
American constitutional tradition. As noted earlier, it is understandable 
that judges in post-communist states and in a Europe ostensibly committed 
to an ever-closer union would welcome borrowing. Their powers are new, 
as is their claim to exercise judicial review—as is the case in many new 
 98. Id. at 38. 
 99. Id. at 40. 
 100. Id. at 42. 
 101. Id. at 44. 
 102. DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 17, at 36 (quoting Benjamin N. Cardozo, Introduction to 
Selected Readings on the Law of Contracts (Association of American Law Schools 1931)) (Oxford 
University Press 2004) (citing Chester A. Newland, The Supreme Court and Legal Writing Learned 
Journals as Vehicles of an Anti-Antitrust Lobby, 48 GEO L.J. 105, 140 (1959)). 
 103. For more detailed evidence on this point, see KERSCH, supra note 2, at 341–58 (exploring the 
rise of global constitutionalism); Kersch, supra note 1, at 4 (exploring the intellectual push for appeal 
to multilateral and international standards by the Court). 
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democracies with correspondingly new commitments to the rule of law. 
These judges need to justify their newly claimed power and authority in 
ways that American judges, whose judicial review powers were 
institutionalized over two hundred years ago, do not. 
In the United States, that power was justified by recourse to a theory of 
popular sovereignty, anchored in the necessity of a judge interpreting a 
written constitutional text.104 In Europe, that power has been justified by 
judicial claims to join as participants in a post-sovereign order, whether it 
involves a unified European Union or a global human rights regime. To be 
sure, American judges in the Founding era understood the new country as 
appealing to universal values and joining the family of nations; they 
believed in natural law and the law of nature. But these appeals, they 
knew, were most prominent, not in the Constitution, but in the Declaration 
of Independence—and in decisions involving international relations, such 
as the seizure of prizes, piracy on the high seas, and the treatment of 
ambassadors.105 These values had nothing to do with the grounding of 
power of judges to void statutes involving domestic political matters. In 
short, judicial power in the United States is anchored in a commitment to 
the rule of law of the U.S. Constitution as written, not in claims to be 
participants in a world system (or, in the contemporary parlance, “global 
governance”).106  
If constitutional traditions are organic—and no one denies that to a 
significant extent they are—the U.S. constitutional tradition is one of the 
most richly developed and longest standing organic constitutional 
traditions in the world, and the oldest, most deeply institutionalized 
tradition of judicial review under a written constitution. The doctrine that 
has been developed under these conditions is intricate and mature. 
Many of the judges most enthusiastic about constitutional borrowing, 
and most critical of U.S. judges for their failures to borrow, come from 
countries with constitutions little more than a decade old. This is clearly 
the case in Eastern Europe and South Africa, but it is true in Western 
Europe as well. Western Europe was the seedbed of dictatorship for 
significant periods of the twentieth century. Indeed, Spain was a fascist 
country until the 1970s. When Marbury v. Madison was decided, France 
 104. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (discussing the Court’s role in 
interpretation.); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 105. See BORK, supra note 4, at 26 (discussing the principal offenses against the law of nations in 
1789). 
 106. See Childress, supra note 24, at 217 (presenting an example of the problem of comparative 
analysis in a constitutional democracy). 
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was ruled by an emperor. Many European countries, even those that were 
longstanding democracies, worked their way through multiple 
constitutions over the course of their histories. Given this context, the 
increasingly heard plea that “they borrowed from us, so why shouldn’t we 
borrow from them?” makes much less sense. The truth is that judges 
around the world borrow from the jurisprudence of the United States 
because the countries in which those judges sit, including those in western 
Europe, have relatively limited experience with constitutional self-
government. 
In contrast, the United States has over two centuries of continuous 
experience with such government under a written constitution that has 
served as an anchor to its unique form of civic nationalism. When the 
United States was a new nation, its judicial opinions contained many more 
allusions to foreign law, particularly English common law, than they do 
today. As America and its constitutional tradition grew, the usefulness of 
such references and allusions declined. Today, it is hardly necessary at all. 
NONSENSE—BORROWING AND TRANSNATIONAL CONSULTATION BY 
JUDGES IS A LONGSTANDING PART OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
TRADITION 
In a broad sense, the decision by the Supreme Court to look abroad is 
not new. Although few scholars have examined foreign influences on the 
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in any great detail, a preliminary reflection 
suggests certain categories of influence. As noted, citations to English 
common law decisions were common during the nation’s early years. 
From its beginning, where appropriate, the Supreme Court—typically in 
cases involving international shipping and trade—frequently referred to 
the law of nations. In addition to references to international law and 
foreign case law, the Court and others who discussed the appropriate 
constitutional arrangements and practices also cited foreign experience as 
a guide to constitutional wisdom. The Federalist Papers, for instance, 
looked to the experiences of, among others, the English, Greeks, Romans, 
and Swiss as part of the process of working toward an intelligent 
constitutional design. Nineteenth and early twentieth century political 
reformers, operating before the courts and elsewhere in politics, made 
aggressive appeals to foreign, typically European, practices. They did so 
both to proffer alternatives to American constitutional habits and policies, 
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and to gather empirical evidence concerning the likely consequences of 
particular institutional arrangements and policies.107 
European comparisons played a major role in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century Progressive Movement and in progressive policy 
arguments in general.108 However, the comparisons were also evident in 
the record and, sometimes, in the opinions of landmark Progressive Era 
Supreme Court decisions. European experience with social welfare 
legislation, for example, was cited in legal briefs to lend authority to novel 
social legislation taking place at home. The famous “Brandeis Brief” filed 
in Muller v. Oregon, for example, is a case in point. 
Viewed more broadly, of course, the entire notion of a living and 
evolving constitution was in many respects an import; it was largely the 
product of an historicist turn in the social science, and, particularly, in 
German social thought.109 At mid-century, the anti-model of 
totalitarianism was referred to repeatedly in, among others, criminal law 
and church-state decisions.110 In articulating a baseline standard of basic 
human dignity, Justice Frankfurter famously referred to the understandings 
of “English speaking peoples” in Rochin v. California.111 Recent studies, 
in an echo of earlier, less known, scholarship, have demonstrated the 
degree to which those struggling for civil rights routinely made arguments 
that appealed simultaneously to the standard of enlightened world opinion, 
U.N. declarations and treaties, and foreign policy imperatives.112 
 107. See, e.g., NOGA MORAG-LEVINE, CHASING THE WIND: REGULATING AIR POLLUTION IN THE 
COMMON LAW STATE 40–73, 79–82 (2003) (discussing the development of pollution control in the 
United States and abroad). 
 108. See generally DANIEL T. RODGERS, ATLANTIC CROSSINGS: SOCIAL POLITICS IN A 
PROGRESSIVE AGE (1998) (discussing the intellectual shift to internationalism during the Progressive 
Era); JAMES T. KLOPPENBERG, UNCERTAIN VICTORY: SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND PROGRESSIVISM IN 
EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN THOUGHT, 1870–1920 (1986) (discussing political action and cultural 
change in progressive politics). 
 109. See generally DOROTHY ROSS, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE; BERT JAMES 
LOEWENBERG, AMERICAN HISTORY IN AMERICAN THOUGHT: CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS TO HENRY 
ADAMS 346–62, 380–424 (1972). 
 110. See PRIMUS, supra note 87 (on the post World War II Court’s jurisprudence as, in significant 
part, a reaction to totalitarianism); KERSCH, supra note 2 (constructing historical views of the analogy 
between Catholicism and totalitarianism). 
 111. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (quoting Malinski v. People of State of N.Y., 324 
U.S. 401, 417 (1945)). 
 112. See KERSCH, supra note 2, at 97 n.187; MARY DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS; AZZA 
SALMA LAYTON, INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND CIVIL RIGHTS POLICIES 58 (2000) (arguing civil 
rights leaders packaged their arguments in an international context). See generally THOMAS 
BORSTELMANN, THE COLD WAR AND THE COLOR LINE: AMERICAN RACE RELATIONS IN THE GLOBAL 
ARENA (2001) (linking the struggle between race relations in the United States with international 
relations); CAROL ANDERSON, EYES OFF THE PRIZE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE AFRICAN 
AMERICAN STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (2003) (examining the African-American appeal to 
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For many, this history will suggest that the interest of key justices of 
the current Supreme Court in international and foreign precedent and 
practice, and the gathering of evidence from around the globe is business 
as usual for the Court. However, this is not the case. Some of the 
transnational turns cited above are more relevant to the Court’s current 
transnational turn than others. Less relevant as legitimating precedent for 
the current turn are the borrowings undertaken by those either seeking to 
design a new constitution to be submitted to the states for ratification—
and those turns abroad to a progenitor legal system, i.e. that of England, by 
common law judges in a newly independent nation with very little guiding 
law by which to steer. Also less relevant are citations to the law of nations 
in classic matters of international law, such as deciding the law of prizes in 
shipping cases. We can certainly debate the purity of the categories of 
“domestic” and “international,” and we can point to situations in which the 
line between them is neither hard nor fast. However, appeals to 
international law or agreements in cases involving admiralty, trade, and 
the seizure of vessels on the high seas, are very different than appeals in 
cases involving wealth redistribution or the constitutional status of racial 
preferences at the University of Michigan. 
Most relevant as precedent are situations where the transnational 
appeals are made as part of a reformist political and intellectual movement 
that has transformational, and, indeed, revolutionary, constitutional 
potential. What seems like a surge in transnational reference points in 
public policy arguments generally and, in some cases, in legal appeals and 
decisions during the Progressive Era is very much a precedent for the 
current Court’s transnational turn. It is important to point out, however, 
that this earlier transnational turn was intricately tied to a revolution in 
theories of the role of the state in American government.113 This revolution 
in political and social scientific thought radically re-made American 
international human rights standards).  
 See also DANIEL KRYDER, DIVIDED ARSENAL (2000) (discussing the conflict between U.S. goals 
in World War II and biased conduct at home); WILLIAM C. BERMAN, THE POLITICS OF CIVIL RIGHTS 
IN THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION 63–67 (1970) (discussing Truman’s goal of addressing 
discrimination in America as a means of strengthening democracy abroad); DONALD R. MCCOY & 
RICHARD T. REUTTEN, QUEST AND RESPONSE: MINORITY RIGHTS AND THE TRUMAN 
ADMINISTRATION (1973) (discussing President Truman’s motivations for improving minority rights as 
a logical progression from America’s rationale in World War II). 
 113. See generally THOMAS L. HASKELL, THE EMERGENCE OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL SCIENCE: 
THE AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION AND THE NINETEENTH CENTURY CRISIS OF 
AUTHORITY (2000); PURCELL, supra note 9; RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN 
AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1955) (discussing evolution in the context of social theory and 
government); LESTER F. WARD, THE PSYCHIC FACTORS OF CIVILIZATION 319 (Ginn & Co. ed., 1906) 
(discussing laissez-faire policies and the role of the state.) 
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constitutionalism and, in the process, empowered the modern, centralized, 
bureaucratic “New American State.”114  
The contemporary transnational turn is similarly tied to a major, 
reform-oriented intellectual and political movement. One thing that 
distinguishes the current turn from its predecessor in the Progressive Era, 
however, is that transnationalism is itself, in many respects, the raison 
d’etre of the current turn. As the constitutional aim of the earlier 
movement was to transfer increasing governing authority to the central 
government in Washington, the constitutional aim of the new movement is 
to transfer governing authority to the arms and competences of the new 
regime of “global governance.” The leap from the national to the global 
level may be comparable to the earlier leap from the state to the national 
level in some respects. In its fundamentals, however, it represents a radical 
new step beyond the Constitution. This is not a simple continuation of a 
long history of transnational citations and references. As part of a 
reformist movement with revolutionary potential, it is no ordinary move. 
Accordingly, it should not be treated as such. 
IT’S A FOREIGN POLICY IMPERATIVE 
If constitutional borrowing is an imperative in the current environment 
in which there is deep concern that anti-Americanism abroad is thwarting 
the nation’s abilities to achieve its objectives, it is the diplomatic, foreign-
policy justifications that many will find the most persuasive. The very fact 
that our constitutional tradition is more richly developed and longstanding 
than any liberal democratic constitutional tradition in the world, and that 
our powers of judicial review under a written constitution within that 
tradition are so deeply institutionalized, may help convey the unhelpful 
impression abroad that Americans are constitutionally self-sufficient in a 
way that other nations (and their judiciaries) are not. This patent self-
sufficiency, taken as a form of unilateral arrogance, clearly arouses 
resentment and anxiety among some governmental professionals abroad. 
Consultation and constitutional borrowings are balms to these 
resentments and anxieties. While borrowing may be good diplomacy and 
helpful foreign policy, it does not absolve U.S. judges from their 
responsibilities to their proper roles at home. These considerations may 
apply when matters traditionally associated with international affairs come 
before the Court. But if every issue traditionally viewed as domestic is 
 114. See generally SKOWRONEK, supra note 95 (discussing the development and attributes of the 
“New American State”). 
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recast as transnational simply because other nations disagree with our 
resolution of the issue, the implications for the nature of self-government 
at home will be revolutionary. Anxieties about American indifference and 
constitutional self-sufficiency on these matters might be better assuaged, 
with less damage to the processes of domestic self-governance, not by 
ever-escalating efforts at judicial cosmopolitanism, but by a renewed 
commitment to educate others abroad about the organic roots and 
democratic imperatives of truly successful, long-lived liberal constitutions. 
A PLEA FOR CONTEXT: THE NEW LEGAL TRANSNATIONALISM IS PART OF 
A TRANSFORMATIVE SOCIAL AND INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT 
This essay does not argue that the Supreme Court has never before 
been influenced by international and transnational events or that it has 
never before cited foreign experience or precedent for a variety of 
purposes in reaching its decisions. It argues instead that, in the past, the 
Court has done so in diverse contexts and for diverse purposes. In a few 
instances, the Court’s recurral to transnational and international 
touchstones was evidence that a transformational intellectual and 
constitutional project—with its center outside the Court and instead inside 
much broader currents of intellectual and political life—was underway, 
and that legal and constitutional doctrines were being altered to fit the 
Court and American law into that reformist political project. This, for 
example, was clearly the case during the Progressive Era, when European 
social policy experience was cited by Progressives both in broader 
political debate, but also to the Court, to help transform the way the Court 
thought about the constitutionality of social and economic regulatory 
legislation that would previously have been voided for violating traditional 
constitutional strictures. What was different in that case was that the 
argument based on the European experience was largely an argument on 
behalf of judicial quietism and deference: European experience was cited 
for purposes of persuading the judges to permit people’s elected 
representatives to legislate with greater freedom what they had determined 
to be the greater public interest. Judicial deference is not at the heart of the 
current Court’s transnational turn. 
The current Court’s turn toward transnationalism, while sharing 
affinities with the turn in the early twentieth century, is most closely 
analogized to the ultimately thwarted transnational turn of the 1940s. The 
geopolitical conditions that stimulated belief in a perceived global 
imperative in the 1940s are remarkably similar to those conditions 
perceived today. For those willing to look beyond technical legal 
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arguments and arguments from precedent and pragmatism, it is apparent 
that what is regarded as the new legal transnationalism is arising from a 
much broader intellectual movement that is systematically re-thinking the 
very future of the nation-state itself, and, with renewed hopefulness, the 
prospects for either world government or global governance. To pretend 
that the Court’s current transnational turn has nothing to do with this 
major intellectual project is to misunderstand fundamentally what is 
happening in American law and in the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme 
Court. 
To be sure, many legal scholars who suggest that American judges 
would benefit from being less provincial and from looking abroad more 
often when deciding American constitutional cases will bristle at any 
effort to yoke them with a movement by others to move toward a system 
of world government or global governance. They will argue that they are 
offering rather technical justifications for such a turn because they actually 
believe in such justifications: they advocate neither world government nor 
global governance. It is only fair to take such scholars at their word. 
Viewed from a broader perspective, however, it seems clear that the 
arguments made by these scholars would not have anywhere near the 
prominence they have today had the broader intellectual movement not put 
a powerful wind in their sails. Some careful and grounded scholars have 
been preaching the virtues of judicious comparative analysis for a very 
long time. This work did not have any great audience before. Now, it has 
an audience that is large and growing. New courses are being created. The 
topics of customary international law, constitutional borrowing, and the 
propriety of looking abroad are suddenly very exciting topics. Why? 
Because they now raise questions that fit into a much larger intellectual 
and political project. For this reason, the current transnational turn cannot 
be discussed in purely technical or pragmatic terms. While it is 
theoretically possible that the substantive content of this turn of the Court 
will operate wholly independently of the substantive political 
commitments of the movement that is inspiring and empowering it, in 
light of the history of the relationship between American political thought 
and American constitutional development, it would be foolish indeed to 
bet on that prospect. The substantive commitments of the project will 
determine the interpretive tendency of the courts.  
As in the 1940s, the current reformist intellectual movement, when 
taken as a whole and viewed at a wide angle across academic disciplines 
and throughout broader intellectual life, has transformational, and, indeed, 
revolutionary objectives. It is rethinking the nature of sovereignty and of 
constitutional government. And, in a strain that is much more highly 
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developed than it was in the 1940s, it is rethinking the institutional role of 
judges as key actors in that broader political project. The effort to build a 
judiciary that sees itself as a highly professionalized, quasi-autonomous, 
and globalized governing class, is keyed into this larger project, and is a 
key adjunct of it. The movement is not asking simply that judges be 
willing to look abroad when it is helpful to them. It is seeking to routinize 
transnational consultation within American constitutional law. 
Recently, a number of influential constitutional scholars have begun to 
emphasize the influence of social and intellectual movements on the 
development of American constitutional law.115 This article has 
characterized the current Supreme Court’s turn in this direction as directly 
related to such a reformist political and intellectual movement. 
Interestingly enough, however, there is a pronounced unwillingness 
among both law professors and political scientists to discuss it as such. 
Most legal scholars insist that it be discussed solely in terms of precedent 
and utility. While they may be interested in the literature on social and 
intellectual movements on law in other contexts (e.g., in describing the 
past triumphs of the labor movement, feminism, and the civil rights 
movement), when it comes to the new transnationalism, they insist that the 
two relevant questions are: first, is this really something new, or, rather, is 
it consistent with routine practice in the past; and, second, is it helpful to 
judges in deciding cases. The answers, typically, have been “we’ve always 
done it this way,” and “it helps, so why not?” This raises the question of 
whether discussions of the influence of social and intellectual movements 
on the law must always take place in the past tense. The answer is likely in 
the affirmative because describing an ongoing and potentially 
revolutionary reform movement as a political and ideological endeavor 
serves to undermine its legitimacy as “law.” To gain authority as law, the 
new legal transnationalism cannot be discussed as politics. 
 115. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, The Jurisgenerative Role of Social Movements in United States 
Constitutional Law, http://islandia.law.edu/sela/SELA%202004/SiegelPaperEnglishSELA2004.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 16, 2005) (examining the role played by social movements in shaping the 
development of U.S. constitutional law); Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, 
Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 948 (2002) (exploring the impact of the 
women’s suffrage movement on U.S. constitutional law); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative 
Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical 
Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943 (2003) (examining the influence of politics in shaping constitutional 
policy in the context of section 5 of the 4th Amendment); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: 
Identity Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 419 (2001) (arguing that social 
movements are a major force driving constitutional evolution); Jack M. Balkin, Brown, Social 
Movements, and Social Change (forthcoming 2005), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/ 
jbalkan/brownsocialmovementandsocialchange1.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2005); KERSCH, supra note 
2. 
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It is for this reason that much of the discussion of the transnational turn 
has been rather technical in focus. Are we legally bound by treaty 
obligations in certain areas? Is customary international law binding on 
American judges? Is looking to foreign experience helpful in resolving 
complicated legal issues? Is constitutional borrowing appropriate and 
helpful? All these questions remain open to debate. To truly understand 
the significance of this phenomenon for our constitutional future, we must 
discuss it at an altogether different level. 
CONCLUSION: THE GLOBALIZED JUDICIARY AND CONSTITUTIONAL SELF-
GOVERNMENT UNDER THE RULE OF LAW 
Most discussions of the impending transnational turn in American law 
involve highly technical debates concerning the domestic applicability of 
various forms of international law, or the propriety of introducing 
transnational evidence and arguments into domestic constitutional 
argument. What is missed by these discussions, and what is illuminated 
here in a largely, though not exclusively, descriptive and empirical 
manner, is that, viewed from a broader perspective, the mere fact that 
vigorous interest is now being shown in this entire constellation of 
questions is itself of major significance. That departure is reflective of a 
broad current of bold thinking among intellectuals in an array of academic 
disciplines concerning not only the place of the United States in the world, 
but also of the future of the nation state itself—thinking that, in a post-
Brown era, has considerable implications for the politics of courts. 
The highly technical and legalistic aspects of many of the discussions 
of related doctrinal questions involving such matters as treaty powers and 
customary international law as they are taken up particularly within the 
legal academy tend to obscure the profound issues of constitutional self-
government at stake. The oscillation from the visionary to the legalistic 
has created an odd climate of discussion. The call for the globalization of 
American judges, for example, is simultaneously an open and furtive 
affair. Justice Breyer, for one, ended a recent speech encouraging judicial 
globalization by citing Wordsworth’s paean to the French Revolution 
(“Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive/But to be young was very 
heaven”),116 and yet, right-wing alarmism notwithstanding, its partisans 
insist, it is utterly routine.117 
 116. WILLIAM WORDSWORTH, THE PRELUDE 444, Book X, line 693 (J.C. Maxwell ed., 1971) 
(1805). 
 117. J. Breyer, supra note 2. 
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In a similar spirit, Dean Harold Hongju Koh of the Yale Law School 
has characterized an increasingly celebrated federal court decision putting 
its imprimatur on the use of customary international law in human rights 
cases in U.S. courts as both business as usual for American courts and the 
Brown v. Board of Education of the transnational public law litigation 
movement.118 Anne-Marie Slaughter has both trumpeted the increasing 
autonomy of judges around the world and the forging among them of self-
conscious identity as instruments of global governance.119 She has also 
reassured those who may be disturbed by such developments of the all but 
unchanged position of these judges within sovereign domestic 
constitutional systems.120 
These shifts in emphasis obscure the highly ambiguous, if not hostile, 
relationship between the modern form of “judicial globalization” and the 
fundamental requirements of the rule of law. On the one hand, 
paradoxically, this new departure draws its sustenance from a renewed 
commitment to both constitutional government and international law 
around the world.121 At the same time, however, in its marked preference 
for judges and interpretation over legislatures and legislating, its 
preoccupation with constitutional sovereignty as a problem, and its 
impatience with policy and rights divergences, even between advanced, 
democratic states, it casually conflates its increasingly deracinated 
understanding of “law” with the evolving policy preferences of the 
movement members. Emblematic work praising “global governance” 
purports to be fully committed to constitutional self-government under the 
rule of law and national sovereignty by noting that, even with a 
transnational turn by a globalized judiciary, old-style governments retain 
ultimate authority and veto power over the emerging networks of global 
governance. Judges are not obligated to follow foreign practices and 
preferences (except when, as is argued in more and more cases, they 
are),122 but merely to actively involve themselves in transnational 
networks and consultations so as to redefine their professional touchstones 
and identity. They are then perfectly free to decide cases independently as 
 118. Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, YALE L.J. 2347, 2366–68 (1991) 
(discussing Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
 119. Slaughter, supra note 67. “[J]udges . . . are rarely motivated by a missionary zeal to build a 
global legal system. Rather, they are driven by more prosaic concerns, such as judicial politics, the 
demands of a heavy caseload, and the impact of new international rules on national litigants. Id. at 78–
79. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See KERSCH, supra note 2, at 341–42. 
 122. See id. at 348–58. 
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constitutional actors and organs of American sovereignty. And, after due 
consultation with their fellow professionals abroad, whatever they decide 
must have been based on a reading of American constitutional values. As 
such, their newly globalized institutional milieu changes both everything 
and nothing. 
Underlying these legal debates is politics—plain and simple. Legal 
scholars have become preoccupied with the “provincialism” of American 
judges because, in going about their business of deciding constitutional 
cases involving domestic matters such as affirmative action, federalism, 
welfare, homosexual rights, election law, and the death penalty, they have 
been reaching the wrong results—that is, results that have not coincided 
with those that the Warren Court ostensibly would have reached, results 
consonant with the policies of European social democracy. There is a 
sense that the United States is a global outlier because it is not a European 
social democracy.123 Such a state of affairs has not been corrected by the 
elected officials in the United States. There is now some hope that it may 
be corrected by an increasingly autonomous, outward-looking, globalized 
American judiciary. Scholars and activists have been laboring 
indefatigably to construct just such a judiciary in the United States. 
The palpable sense in American academia and elsewhere, that the 
United States is a global outlier, is strange in many respects. Far from 
being an outlier, the United States, in crucial aspects of its politics and its 
culture, including its commitment to democracy and the rule of law, is 
clearly within the mainstream of contemporary liberal democratic political 
orders.124 In fact, so far as the normative case for constitutional borrowing 
is concerned, this simply must be the case. If our constitutional system and 
its underlying culture is significantly different from that of countries we 
seek to borrow from, the decision to borrow from those countries is on the 
weakest normative grounds. If, on the other hand, the countries we seek to 
borrow from are essentially similar to our own, it is not clear why the fact 
that we arrive at different conclusions about particular policy issues 
presents a problem in need of a solution.  
 123. See id. at 342; Ackerman, supra note 7, at 773 (arguing that American judicial practice is 
provincial because “it does not engage the texts that have paramount significance for the rest of the 
world.”); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S UNIFINISHED REVOLUTION AND 
WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER (2004) (arguing that the U.S. should adopt Franklin D. 
Roosevelts’ proposed second bill of rights, citing numerous international constitutions in support of 
broadening United States citizens’ rights). 
 124. Indeed, it is quite plausible to argue that its commitment to constitutional self-government is 
more firmly rooted and stable here than elsewhere, which may itself be causing the very “problem” 
that the partisans of constitutional borrowing and other transnationalist trends are working so fervently 
to correct. 
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The United States is not an outlier vis-à-vis other liberal democratic 
constitutional states. In fact, it is quite possible that it was this same 
allegedly vexatious belief in its uniqueness and stubborn unwillingness of 
the United States to embrace ostensibly “inevitable” historical trends (as 
identified by leading European intellectuals and their followers in the 
United States) that kept the nearly extinguished flame of democracy and 
freedom alive through their darkest days in the twentieth century.125 
The problem is less that the United States is a global outlier in a world 
committed to liberal constitutional self-government than that many 
Europeans believe that the United States is a global outlier. These are very 
different things.126 The politics and ideology behind this perception are a 
complicated matter, having much to do with cultural dispositions toward 
ideas and history, not to mention ignorance.127 Suffice it to say, a fervent 
belief among intellectuals and scholars that judges and governing officials 
in the United States are not seizing the moment of destiny to bring about a 
“new world order” characterized by a stipulated agreement on a range of 
domestic public policy issues is hardly a reason for concluding the U.S. 
officials must have gone horribly wrong. 
The feeling by many scholars that a newly globalized judiciary is 
unproblematic has many roots. Despite the fact that the discussion is an 
apparently legal one, its more proximate roots are to be found in the legal 
profession’s comfortable assimilation of the constitutional ethos of the 
post-New Deal administrative state, which is impatient with the distinction 
between pragmatic policymaking and law.128 Political scientist Theodore J. 
Lowi observed that the public philosophy of that state nourishes a belief in 
the promise of a world beyond law. Contemporary work on judicial 
policymaking celebrates rather than criticizes these developments on the 
grounds of their effectiveness.129 
In it most sober, and, hence, politically influential, incarnations, the 
appeal for a new transnationalism, and the insistence that this new 
 125. See MARK MAZOWER, DARK CONTINENT: EUROPE’S TWENTIETH CENTURY (1999); MARK 
LILLA, RECKLESS MIND: INTELLECTUALS IN POLITICS (2001). 
 126. See JEAN-FRANCOIS REVEL, L’OBSESSION ANTI-AMERICAINE: SON FONCTIONNEMENT, SES 
CAUSES, DES CONSEQUENCES [ANTI-AMERICAN OBSESSION: ITS OPERATION, ITS CAUSES, ITS 
CONSEQUENCES] (2002); PHILIPPE ROGER, L’ENNEMI AMERICAINE: GENEAOLOGIE DE 
L’ANTIAMERICANISM FRANCAISE [THE AMERICAN ENEMY: GENEAOLOGY OF FRENCH ANTI-
AMERICANISM] (2002). 
 127. Though it should go without saying, Americans are not the only people ignorant of other 
people’s cultures and histories. To those in other countries, America’s culture is, naturally, foreign. 
 128. See LUSTIG, supra note 27, at 25. See also id. ch. 7. 
 129. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 27, at 1–25, 348–49 (explaining that the modern 
administrative state requires an active, policy-making judiciary). 
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transnationalism is best accomplished through increased judicial 
consultation and borrowing in constitutional cases, is fundamentally an 
administrative vision. Its naked focus is on judges as policymakers, 
searching the globe for expert advice and experience on the best means of 
solving public policy problems, and the fact that it is being undertaken by 
judges rather than bureaucratic officials should not deceive us in this 
regard. It is decidedly a post-legal vision.130  
In his classic book, The End of Liberalism, Lowi warned of the 
emergence in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries of a new 
governing order with a public philosophy committed to the practice of 
administration without law. In this philosophy, “interest group liberalism,” 
centered around the new, relatively autonomous administrative agencies 
governed beyond the oversight of the people’s democratically elected 
representatives, even if, strictly speaking, Congress always had the 
ultimate authority to rein them in. Scholars looking for evidence that the 
New Deal shattered the practice of constitutional government in the United 
States need only look at much of the new work on the perceived 
imperative of a “globalized judiciary” to see these Progressive and New 
Deal dynamics traced out to global level. This work also had the added 
twist that it simply assumed that judges, and not just bureaucratic officials 
working within administrative agencies, should be relatively autonomous 
policymakers.131 The literature on constitutional borrowing studies their 
ever-tightening relationship with other members of their professional class 
involved in a common administrative project—judges in other countries. 
 130. See Karl Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934) (arguing 
that U.S. courts have shaped the Constitution to meet current policy goals as they have seen fit). In this 
regard, it is no accident that the Court’s most sophisticated proponent of the new transnationalism and 
a globalized judiciary is Justice Breyer, a professor of administrative law and admirer of the French 
Conseil d’Etat. Justice Breyer’s chief interest has long been in designing efficient and effective 
regulatory regimes. See Kersch, supra note 28. Breyer’s framing of the transnational imperative, like 
that of the chief academic proponent of a “globalized judiciary” and “a global community of courts,” 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, is plainly rooted in a classically progressive ideological vision that will at once 
be apparent to anyone who has studied the Progressive Movement and the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century rise of the modern American administrative state. This framing evinces a strong faith 
in the judgment of elite expert administrators, whom it aspires to construct as a quasi-autonomous 
problem-solving class. In this project, the transnational imperative is frankly cosmopolitan, anti-
formalist, and, in the final analysis, anti-legal. At the same time, like earlier Progressives, particularly 
those most inclined toward scientific government by experts, it is possessed both of a healthy distrust 
of democracy, and by marked public policy commitments on substantive issues. See ELDON J. 
EISENACH, THE LOST PROMISE OF PROGRESSIVISM (1994). 
 131. It is telling that, in her new book, Anne-Marie Slaughter treats judges as indistinguishable 
from the other government officials who, through their transnational “networks” and their participation 
in the process of “global governance,” are building the “new world order.” See SLAUGHTER, supra 
note 31. 
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The literature on “transnational civil society” also studies their ever-
tightening relationship with transnational advocacy groups, who 
increasingly file policy briefs before them in an effort to influence their 
decisions.  
Lowi’s attack on the flight from self-government under the rule of law 
at the time of the New Deal was domestic in focus. That the same 
dynamics are now taking place at the global level and, in key policy areas, 
through the rulings of federal judges who are even less accountable than 
administrators, is a truly worrisome development. It is not too much to say 
that, although it is in its early stages, the very future of self-government 
under the rule of law within the United States is now at stake in these 
initiatives and debates.132  
Longstanding, stable and successful democratic constitutions, like that 
of the United States, are defined by their relatively clear and transparent 
lines of responsibility and authority. The deliberate blurring of offices and 
authorities championed by proponents of judicial globalization are, as 
such, moves in an anti-legal and anti-constitutional direction.133 
Constitutions create a government; they do not launch quasi-autonomous 
“networks” of “governance.” Rule by networks of governance that have 
succeeded in cultivating a quasi-autonomy through a constructed 
legitimacy is not constitutional government as Americans have 
traditionally understood it. 
The academics and judges who expect to rule in the age of “global 
governance” will not likely raise strenuous objections to these trends. In 
the 1940s, the visionary hopes of the predecessor world government and 
 132. When viewed in the long term, it does not appear this view is overstated. Those who are not 
careful students of the politics of judging often do not appreciate the ways in which judges affect 
major change by often imperceptible degrees. See Martin M. Shapiro, The European Court of Justice, 
in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE AGE OF DEMOCRACY 277–78 (David M. O’Brien & Peter H. 
Russell eds., 2001). 
[J]udicial decision or policy or lawmaking will be incremental, for incrementalism is the best 
method of making new policy while maintaining stability and predictability. Moreover, 
incrementalism is the best solution to the principal institutional problem in courts: that they 
must make law but must appear not to be doing so . . . Judges become expert at manipulating 
[the] general-particular dynamic [inherent in a case] so as initially to embed policy changes of 
great long-term significance in what appear to be minor, insignificant decision-making 
occasions. The new law is established in a series of minor, esoteric, technical cases. By the 
time its full policy impact is perceived by other, the new doctrine is well established and the 
judges and their supporters are asking why others are complaining now about a long-
established, long-accepted law. 
Id. (citations omitted). See also Essays of “Brutus” to the Citizens of the State of New York, in 
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 301–60 (Michael Kannen 
ed., 1986) (warning that the U.S. Constitution gives the judiciary virtually unchecked power). 
 133. See RABKIN, LAW WITHOUT NATIONS?, supra note 4. 
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global governance movement were dashed both by world events that 
belied their ideological understandings (such as the eruption of the Cold 
War) and, as the movement began to attract public attention, by popular 
political and constitutional resistance in the name of law, democracy, and 
self-governance.134 As it grows in strength, this seemingly inevitable turn 
toward transnationalism and an increasingly globalized judiciary, at least 
in a vibrant and grounded democracy like the United States, will remain 
vulnerable to such events. 
 134. See KERSCH, supra note 2, at 103–11 (describing the willingness to draw on international 
treaties in the wake of World War II); DUANE TANANBAUM, THE BRICKER AMENDMENT 
CONTROVERSY: A TEST OF EISENHOWER’S POLITICAL LEADERSHIP (1988) (describing the political 
battle between President Eisenhower and the anti-internationalist movement that provided the Bricker 
Amendment controversy). A rejoinder to allusions to the Bricker Amendment controversy that 
opponents of the transnational turn can expect is that, of course, there was popular resistance to an 
earlier transnational turn on the Court, but that it was motivated by racism. It is a familiar move among 
contemporary constitutional scholars who understand themselves as “progressives” to link 
constitutional provisions and decisions they do not like with racism, the ultimate trump card in 
contemporary progressive politics. Recent discussions of the electoral college and Bush v. Gore, and, 
for that matter (and bizarrely), the Clinton impeachment, have moved predictably along these lines. 
There is no doubt that white Southern concerns about racial issues were an important component of the 
Bricker Amendment controversy. But it is usually forgotten that two other worries concerning 
importations from abroad were also important: the issue of socialized medicine (Truman had proposed 
a national health care scheme) and the augmentation of labor union power in the wake of a series of 
paralyzing post-War strikes. While I certainly have no brief for racism, I believe the constitutional 
resistance provided by the Bricker-ites regarding the last two issues was both helpful and fortunate. 
Regardless, the key point is that this resistance to the aggressive judicial importation of foreign public 
policy standards, as a matter of historical fact, occurred, and, if the Court gets too aggressive in this 
regard, could very well occur again. 
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